A Brief Note on Japan’s AI Race, the Copyright Dilemma, and Generative AI Impact on Authorship

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Abstract

This article delves into the intricate interplay between copyright laws, Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, and the evolving role of authors in the contemporary digital landscape, especially after the irruption of Generative AI systems, as ChatGPT. The paper scrutinizes Japan’s approach to copyright in the realm of AI training, highlighting the delicate balance between safeguarding creators’ rights and fostering competitiveness in the global market. By examining the concept of “the death of the Author” as elucidated by Roland Barthes, the study explores how AI-generated content challenges traditional notions of authorship and creativity.

Keywords: Copyright Dilemma, Artificial Intelligence, Authorship, Japan, Competitiveness, Roland Barthes

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Roland Barthes (1915-1980) concluded his renowned article “The Death of the Author” (1967) by asserting that “to give writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author” ([1967] 1977, p. 148).\(^1\) Ironically, today’s global pursuit of power over Artificial Intelligence (AI) is underscoring Barthes’ proposition, albeit with significant modifications. With the understanding that AI relies on a continuous influx of data, we find ourselves in a situation where we can rephrase Barthes’ statement to declare that “the birth (and nurturing) of AI must be at the cost of the death of the Author.” This idea is exemplified by Japan’s debates concerning copyright, and the recent stance of the Japanese government, which asserts that copyright will not be applicable to AI training. It implies that materials utilised to feed AI datasets for generative AI might not be protected by copyright (see Kii, 2023; Prime, 2023; Sameer, 2023; and Pandey, 2023).

This paper aims to delve into some political and philosophical inquiries surrounding what has been coined the “copyright dilemma”: the intricate choice between safeguarding copyrighted data and consequently lacking competitiveness in the ongoing global AI battle for technological supremacy or maintaining competitiveness while compromising authors’ and creators’ rights over their works. First, the text will explore the implications of global power dynamics in Artificial Intelligence (AI) on copyright laws, focusing on Japan’s approach to copyright and AI training. It delves into the political and philosophical aspects of the

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“copyright dilemma” and Japan’s regulation of AI. The concept of Generative AI (GenAI) and its potential impact on copyright issues are also discussed, because the rise of AI technologies challenges traditional notions of authorship and creativity, leading to the concept of the “death of the author.” However, as the text will discuss, the shift to a notion of “co-authorship” as a collective and distributed process raises questions about responsibility for evaluating the ethical and political implications of AI-generated content. While some scholars advocate for “unauthorized-authorship” or “impersonal-authorship,” there are powerful reasons to find this position problematic regarding art and creative work, questions that need philosophical attention.

1 Japan’s Quest of AI Power: between “agile governance” and “philanthrocapitalism”

Last year, 2023, the G7 summit was held in Japan, with one of its main topics being how to approach AI regulation. The leaders of the G7 member states—France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and the European Union (EU) as a non-enumerated member—put AI regulation on the agenda. The ideal equilibrium that the G7 members and the EU share is the aspiration to find a middle ground between over-regulating and under-regulating AI. In the words of Andrea Bertolini (2020, p. 21), referring to the EU context but also applicable to other countries: “Regulating AI is a challenging task. Over-regulating AI could have a chilling effect on innovation, while under-regulating AI can result in serious harm to citizens’ rights and a missed opportunity to shape the future of European society.” On the other hand, Japan’s position, well represented in Habuka’s report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), is analogous:

While regulating AI is somewhat necessary for preventing threats to fundamental values, there is a concern that the burden of compliance and the ambiguity of regulatory contents may stifle innovation. In addition, regulatory fragmentation will impose
serious costs not only on businesses but also society.

(Habuka, 2023, p. 1)

Compared with the EU’s regulatory strategy, which Habuka (2023, p. 6) defines as a “holistic and hard-law based” approach sustained by obligations –encompassing governance, transparency, and security for high-risk AI– and sanctions in case of violations, Japan and the United Kingdom are opting for a “sector-specific and soft-law-based” approach (Habuka, 2023, p. 6). The aim of this approach is to promote “agile” AI governance “through nonbinding guidance, while also mandating transparency and data protection in certain sectors” (2023, p. 6). Japan, in this context, is evidently embracing a “neoliberal keyword” (Holborow, 2016): “agile governance.”

The semantics underlying “agile governance” are sufficiently clear and align well with digitalised societies within neoliberal economies, such as Japan. Japan is adapting the nomenclature of the World Economic Forum (WEF) to suit its own political and economic agenda. In a 2019 briefing paper, the WEF defined the concept as follows:

The term “agile governance” itself sets the expectation that governance can and should be more agile to keep pace with the rapid changes of society, driven significantly by the development and deployment of emerging technologies. In agile governance, governments remain central actors in policy development and enforcement. They define the parameters of governance protocols for technological innovations, thereby identifying the outcomes to attain as a collective endeavour. However, only through closer collaboration with innovators and the private sector can policy-makers move closer towards agility. This close collaboration will allow the public and private sectors to leverage their complementary capabilities to co-design governance frameworks and policy best suited to the digital revolution.

(WEF, 2019, p. 7).

It is crucial to focus on what is being described as “agile” in this con-
text: governance. The shift from “government” to “governance” holds significant importance. The term “governance” is one of the most prominent yet multifaceted political expressions in use today. Since the 1990s, “governance” has embraced a comprehensive prescriptive meaning – determining how states ought to act considering the impact and influence of non-state actors. As Dufour (2009, p. 27) affirms, “the government acquires a flexible form of regulation, it is there where political governance leads us, to the alleged self-regulation of private interests that added-together are able to shape the general interest.” In short, then, nowadays “the term ‘government’ is reserved for the old hierarchical power, the authority of the state, and centralist conceptions, whereas ‘governance’ suggests a new, horizontal mode of power management” (Dufour, 2009, p. 28).

Japan is at the forefront of advocating the concept of “agile governance,” as demonstrated by initiatives such as the “Agile Nations” network in collaboration with the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates (see UK Government Agile Nations, 2023). Notably, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has released a series of reports on “Agile Governance,” aligned with the vision of Society 5.0, defined as “A human-centered society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace and physical space.” (Japan Cabinet Office, n.d.).

Within this perspective, “agile governance” advocates a political and policy framework presented as a “new multi-stakeholder approach” (METI, 2022, p. 17) This entails a comprehensive adoption and adaptation of the business management model by the Japanese government, as it relies on “interests,” “objectives,” and “risks.” Consequently, as explicitly stated by the Japanese government, in this framework, “the central role is played by businesses that contribute to the generation of value through the provision of services and products,” (METI, 2022, p. 17) which means that, in fact, businesses are “ruler-maker” and not “ruler-taker”. The government, from his side, occupies the empty space of businesses as “ruler-taker;”, and “play a facilitator role, by gather-
ing stakeholders to promote discussion so that they can appropriately formulate rules, or by providing incentives to encourage stakeholders, especially businesses, to conduct appropriate monitoring and provide information.” (METI, 2022, p. 18). We can assert that, considering governments rely heavily on technological experts primarily engaged in technological industries, “agile governance” resembles, or at the very least, constitutes an advanced iteration of the “minimal state.” It is not only that Japan confirms that, as Bremmer and Suleyman (2023) argue, “AI governance cannot be exclusively state centered, since governments neither understand nor control AI.” Furthermore, private technology companies “wield real –even sovereign– power and agency in the digital spaces they have created and effectively govern” (Bremmer and Suleyman, 2023).

Into political discourse, this “agile governance” is introduced as one of the hollow-promises words that Prime Minister Kishida Fumio “grand design” calls “the New Form of Capitalism” that he bases on Edo merchant business philosophy, sanpo-yoshi, “three-way good”, or “a triple win”, for buyers, sellers, and society.

With a harsh critic style, according to The Economist (2022) Banyan column, Kishida’s “grand design” it is empty and, specially, it is old rhetoric that what proves is stagnation and lack of dynamism. I go a little further, arguing that it reminds, even plagiarizes, Sarkozy’s reaction against 2008 world financial crisis with his proposal of the same recipe –new form of capitalism–. But, where the French politician thought of a finance at the service of business and citizens, and envisioned a reform of the international financial system to this new form of capitalism “better regulated, with a greater sense of morality and solidarity” to achieve “sustainable growth” (Sarkozy, 2009), Kishida defends an orientalistic-style that, sustained in an East-West dichotomy, and focused, as The Economist clearly sees, in “canny domestic politics” (2022), envisions the State as a corporation. That is, as “a multi-stakeholder process that should consider the interests of not only its shareholders, but also its diverse stakeholders including its employees, its customers and business partners, and the local community” (Kishida, 2022a). That, presumably,
will put in the centre “people” and “human capital” that he conceptualizes as “experience-centric” rather than “material-centric” (Kishida, 2022a). For all these reasons, Kishida’s proposal is a kind of renewal of Itami Hiroyuki’s (1987) “corporate governance” and, fundamentally, his *jinpon-shugi*, human-centered capitalism, or human-capitalism, but now not with the form of big corporations, but “startups” that, in opinion of the Prime Minister, “will save Japan” developing “added value,” (Kishida, 2022a).

Last, but not least, it is curious enough to see that the model of what “agile governance” can, “materially”, look like are private charitable foundations that, for Kishida, are perfectly illustrated in Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. This charitable foundation that “emerge from the corporate world”, illustrates the “new kind of coordination between the public and private sectors” (Kishida, 2022a) and, in his vision, how the private sector can replace State –public powers– roles. So, it seems that Kishida’s “new form of capitalism” is a political slogan that follows what *The Economist* coined in 2006 as “philanthrocapitalism,” with his confidence on public and private interests as “mutually compatible” (McGoey, 2012), and a strong belief in the moral value of capitalism promoting social advance.

In brief, Kishida’s propaganda around the “new form of capitalism” assumes a disjunctive logic structure that is historically false. In pretends to account on historical phases of capitalism –from laissez-faire to welfare state to neoliberalism– with the aim of defending a conjunctive situation where market and state, and public and private, that he prejudices erroneously as autonomous spheres, “work together” (Kishida, 2022b). There is no room for a clear-cut between “private” and “public” spheres. They depend on, and, in fact, they are forms of the triadic system that, as Karatani Kōjin ([2003] 2005; [2010] 2014), has showed several times explaining the trinity of Capital-Nation-State, are “mutually complementary”: Private-Capital depends on Public-State that need to be glued by the (artificial) homogeneity of Nation. They are interdependent, not independent, and complementary to each other to capitalism survival that, logically, Kishida is not wishing to erase, but to refund or renew in
a Lampedusa’s style. In fact, for wanting “everything to stay as it is” in capitalism, there is no better formula than the one the Prime Minister is rhetorically introducing:

The public sector will act more than ever to draw out the power of the private sector as much as possible, while the private sector will make greater use of its capabilities to solve social problems that have until now been considered the domain of the public sector. Under this new form of capitalism, social challenges can become engines of growth. The government will prime the pump to create new markets in challenging areas, attract private investment, and foster public-private collaborations. In this way, we will address social problems while at the same time driving robust growth.

(Kishida, 2022b)

Within this scenario, Kishida administration believes that AI services and technologies can help to boost Japan economy. Within the global politics of AI landscape, Japan shares with other countries “hypes and expectations” that are translated into requirements and regulations (Ulnicane et al., 2022, p. 33).

2 Paradise for businesses and a limbo for author’s rights?

Due to these expectations, all remaining in a high degree of uncertainty, one of the most salient AI debates accelerated by the impacts and businesses opportunities of GenAI is copyright issue.

What is Generative AI (GenAI)? We can look at the case of ChatGPT. On November 30, 2022, the American AI laboratory OpenAI launched ChatGPT (Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer), a language model-based chatbot designed “to follow an instruction in a prompt and provide a detailed response” (OpenAI, 2022). This GenAI was introduced in a free usage version for the purpose of gathering users’ feedback and understanding its strengths and weaknesses (OpenAI, 2022). This com-
plimentary version assists developers in comprehending its strengths and limitations. However, users’ interactions with the chatbot also offer valuable information to the company, as these conversations are employed and assessed by AI trainers to enhance the system (OpenAI, 2023a). Simultaneously, should a user share “sensitive information” during their conversations with ChatGPT, this data becomes part of the system’s stream and contributes to its development. OpenAI does not guarantee data security or confidentiality (OpenAI, 2023b). Thus, what the Californian artist Richard Serra (1938-) highlighted in his video art *Television Delivers People* (1973), now widely known as the phrase “if something is free, you are the product,” holds true but on a larger scale. Users serve as both a product –OpenAI collects personal information including account details required for registration, and notably, “user content” encompassing personal information shared in inputs, file uploads, and feedback with GenAI (OpenAI, 2023b)–, and a producer –users offer their intellectual contributions alongside personal information that is utilized to enhance GenAI services, conduct research, and develop new programs and services (OpenAI, 2023b).

It must be noted that Japan has been called by professor of Law at Waseda University, Ueno Tatsuhiro, as a “paradise” for machine learning and Text-and-Data Mining (TDM) (2021, p. 149) based on Article 30-4 of the 2018 Japanese Copyright Act. The article “allows an exploitation of a work by any means to the extent deemed necessary, if the exploitation is aimed at neither enjoying nor causing another person to enjoy the work, unless such exploitation unreasonably prejudices the interests of the copyright holder” (Ueno, 2021, p. 148), and includes exploitation of works which is needed in experiments for the development and utilization of technology; exploitation for using the work in a data analysis, and exploitation for using the work in the course of computer data processing or otherwise that does not involve perceiving the expressions in such work through the human sense (Article 30-4, Japanese Copyright Data, 2018). With GenAI impact, Japanese writers and artists voice their concerns over copyright rights (*The Japan Times*, August 17, 2023) that the government seems to study to re-examine actual legal framework to limit actions that can attempt against creators’

These fears point to copyright infringements in relation to GenAI that has two sides, as Tosaki *et al.* (2023, p. 1) describe: one with datasets for training and, the other, when using GenAI generating new works. In Japan, the permission of TDM allowed under article 30-4 Japanese Copyright Data “does not apply to the production of a new work by using generative AI because it is obvious that the production of a new work does not meet the Non-Enjoyment Purpose Requirement” (Tosaki *et al.*, 2023, p. 5) But is as well obvious that if one generates a work with GenAI tools and this GenAI work is out for sale or publicly transmitted, the problem is on how to prove the copyright infringement if, first, you are allowing free use of copyrighted works in datasets. The situation represents a perfect example of a *probatio diabolica* because, lacking datasets transparency, and, at the same time, having allowed free use of data to machine learning training, it is extremely difficult to prove that a copyrighted work has been used to train the machine. So, although is legally logic to ask the developers of GenAI which works has been included in dataset, this logic will be futile unless GenAI developers are obligated to comply with transparency requirements to publicly indicate which copyrighted data has been used for training, as the under parliamentary discussion EU AI Act is proposing (European Parliament, 2023). So, for now, Japan soft-law position opts for maintaining competitiveness while compromising authors’ and creators’ rights over their works.

This state of uncertainty, this limbo in which authors and their rights are trapped, requires greater attention from a political and legal point of view, and, correspondingly, greater focus on philosophically answering the question about the place of the artist and his creative work. This is what will be briefly discussed in the following section since part of the solutions given to the copyright dilemma, in Japan and in other contexts, will rest on how we conceive what an author is, or what is not.2

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2 For reasons of limiting the length of the article and focusing my attention on its main objectives —scrutinizing Japan’s approach to copyright in the realm of AI training and, based on that, exploring how AI-generated content challenges traditional notions of authorship and creativity— I cannot delve deeper into the questions raised by one of the anonymous reviewers. I hope to address these in future
In a very recent article, Epstein et al. (2023, p. 1110) synthesize the GenAI impact on art and creativity processes, considering GenAI tools as a “new medium” that, as in other historical moments, will transform art and aesthetics, affecting artistic production and consumption and “re-configuring media ecosystem” which means that we will need to think about data sources and how, if possible, to determine output authorship and intellectual property rights associated with data input.

The whole GenAI tools mechanism “relies on training data made by people. The models ‘learn’ to generate art by extracting statistical patterns from existing artistic media” (Epstein et al., 2023, p. 1110) and, so, what is being generated—the output, that is, the “text” or the “image” or a “music piece”—it is only the result of a combination of database on statistical predictors in a sequence. As Gary Marcus (2022), critic of the recent GenAI “fever”, writes, the output of spread tools as GPT is a pastiche, but one that lacks the intention, and the knowledge, to explain what is being imitated from previous works or the reason for select different works to generate a literary, visual, or artistic composition that “it is a mimic that knows not whereof it speaks”:

In some sense, GPT is like a glorified version of cut and paste, where everything that is cut goes through a paraphrasing/synonymy process before it is paste but together—and a lot of important stuff is sometimes lost along the way. When GPT sounds plausible, it is because every paraphrased bit that it pastes together is grounded in something that actual humans said, and there is often some vague (but often irrelevant) relationship between.

(Marcus, 2022)
What is at stake here is not only that GenAI tools, such as GPT, are undermining the concept of authorship (Huang, 2023), but rather, intriguingly, what Barthes ([1967] 1977, p. 146) aimed to challenge regarding the singular “theological” significance of the Author-God in the message is now being transferred to the Machine-God. However, like any deity imagined in our thoughts, there exists an inherent incapability to achieve clear access—even when reason is set aside in favour of faith—to its intention and an understanding rooted in experience; an understanding that is, and always has to be, historical, contextual, and tangible. Therefore, upon scrutinising the pastiche products created by GenAI tools, we can attribute a fresh interpretation to Barthes’ ([1967] 1977, p. 142) proposition: “Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.” In essence, within GenAI-generated “writing”, which in this context refers to pastiche text generated from data, authorial identities are relinquished, partially due to its composite nature, as the output comprises distinct data fragments or components, and even demonstrates neutrality in the sense of lacking distinctive or expressive features – neither one nor the other.

In this debate, Mark Coeckelbergh and David J. Gunkel (2023, p. 3) defend that, when we look at Large Language Models (LLM) as ChatGPT, the questions regarding the “machine” replacement of human authors are “misguided”, cause “humans never had such absolute authority and agency in the first place” recognizing that technology always plays a role as “author.” They understand here for “technology” any “tool” made by humans, used to extend their capacities, and vividly depending on human intervention to “function”: “humans and technologies are entangled with one another” (Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2023, p. 3). Therefore, trying to “deconstruct” their (aprioristic) assumption that any defence of authorship depends on an “absolute” and “authoritarian” conception, they propose to rename the processes and performances of GenAI as fruit of a “co-authorship,” a joint-agency or human-machine hybridity.

I defend that, although at first sight, their argument can sound convinc-
ing for those that continue to defend old tales about what they call the “Platonic distinction between appearance and the real” at the heart of “Western metaphysics,” (Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2023, p. 2) it is circular and, in fact, is not addressing well what they want to deconstruct, that is, the concept of “authorship” itself. First, because, curious enough, their notion of “co-authorship” is depending on “authorship” itself, so, the question is that, if they pretend to go beyond “outdates views on authorship” (Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2023, p. 9), why they depend on recognizing that “language”, “tool” and “human” are, separately, “authors”? Philosophically, it makes no sense to try to transcend a supposed monolithic use of “authorship” only by the way to recognize a “plurality” of “authors” that “collaborate” in “authoring” something, as a text.

When one reads the following:

Language and text (also) speak and write; they already co-author, when we think or utter the phrase “I write.” It is true that “I write;” but the language and texts that comes to be produced also write the subject who supposedly speaks in and by the writing. Even when one writes without an LLM application such as ChatGPT, language and text are already implicated and involved as co-author and readers make the text make sense through the process and performance of reading.

(Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2023, p. 9)

One wonders if the philosophers are misleading the Foucaultian “author-function” thesis, that differs from simply the “writer,” and it is distinguished by identifying in it a discourse, ideology or responsibility, and the author-as-person or individual. Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, in fact, seem to defend an “unauthorized-authorship,” or an “impersonal-authorship,” but, as the quotation shows, transferring “personal” authorship qualities to abstract entities as “language” and “text” and, of course, LLM tools. Instead of defending the “anonymity” or even the “impersonality” of text production to its final consequences, they continue to depend on the notion of “author.” At the same time, it would
be necessary to ask them to distinguish what is involved in creation and what in reading, comprehension and “making” sense of the text, for even there is a great distance between “creation” and “comprehension.” To “create” is not necessary connected with “making sense” of something – text, image, sound, etc. This last point has implications on what the authors are to worry about, that is “critical ethical and political questions” that depend on “someone” (a person or a group of people that decides what is good or politically permissible) who ethically and politically “evaluates.” When they put questions like “What kind of performances and processes are good? What is a good and meaningful text? Who are the people who decide about what performances and modes of meaning-making count and are permissible? ...” (Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2023, p. 9), all the possible answers need a subject: Good to whom? Good and meaningful to whom? Permissible to whom?

At the same time, it is curious that these philosophers applaud with enthusiasm this GenAI-effective “death of the Author”\(^3\) that they use to revive post-structuralist theories, particularly Derrida and his deconstruction, to respond to those voices that, as we have seen with Marcus, explain how LLM, as ChatGPT, “technically” works. For Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, what LLM technology opens is a way to go out of “Western metaphysics and its logocentric perspective” and, instead of this anchor of words to things in the real world, that is what Derrida rejects, they introduce as a “novelty” what is no more than a mere repetition. We are in front of an \textit{enkýklios paideía: to see language and meaning-making as a self-contained system. For them, the dictionary is the best illustration of this “revolution”: “In a dictionary, words come to have meaning by their relationship to other words. In pursuing definitions of words in the dictionary, one remains within the system of linguistic signifiers}

\(^3\) About Barthes’ “death of the Author,” Coeckelberg and Gunkel (2023, p. 6) write: “What this phrase indicates is not the end-of-life of any particular individual or the end of human writing but the termination and closure of the figure of the author as the authorizing agent and guarantee of what is said in and by writing.” As one of the anonymous reviewers perceptively noted, we can further argue that if Barthes’ intention was to critique the capitalist myth of textual ownership as the sole creator of text, the positions of Coeckelbergh and Gunkel risk distorting Barthes’ intention and, consequently, justifying capitalist non-human accumulation strategies. I would like to thank the reviewer for their careful reading of the manuscript and for sharing this insightful comment.
and never gets outside language to the referent [...]” (Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2023, p. 7). Trying to debunk this logocentric perspective and introducing this old-novelty by the way to lock-up everything into “enact and perform meaning by way of interrelationships to other texts and contexts in which it is already situated and from which it draws its discursive resources” (Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, 2023, p. 8) it is, to say the least, philosophically futile. One wonders if they have considered that all dictionaries suffer from circularity, and so it happens in LLM with the extraction of statistical patterns from the “self-contained system of data.” And one wonders as well if it will not be less presumptuous, and ethically and politically more substantial, not to move so quickly towards the celebration of “anonymity” or hybrid “performances” as a way to fight against a nowadays “fictitious” philosophical problem (the real/appearance binary or Author/copyist) and, precisely, to dedicate more philosophical efforts to address “human, all-too-human” issues, such as the exploitation of “human” workers (see Perrigo, 2023) that are art and part of what remains “behind” this “deconstruction” spectacle performance.

4 Conclusion

This paper has explored some questions regarding the complex and multifaceted nature of the copyright dilemma in the context of GenAI, using the case of Japan’s AI quest for power as a concrete example of the challenges posed by this dilemma. I have argued that the use of LLM and AI technologies in the context of copyright raises a range of legal, ethical, and political concerns. The question requires careful consideration of a range of factors, including legal frameworks, ethical concerns, and political considerations. In any case, Japan’s recent stance on copyright and AI raises important questions about the balance between protecting copyrighted data and maintaining competitiveness in the global market. The fact that Japan has taken a relatively permissive approach to copyright in the context of AI training suggests that it is prioritizing competitiveness over the protection of authors’ and creators’ rights.
Further, the rise of AI technologies poses significant challenges to traditional assumptions about authorship and creativity, and that is why the concept of the “death of the Author” is particularly relevant in this context. But, although GenAI technologies challenge the idea of the author as a singular, creative individual, it is not clear that we can change without problem to a notion of “co-authorship” considered as a collective and distributed process. The distinction between “creation” and “comprehension” is an important one and raises questions about who is responsible for evaluating the ethical and political implications of AI-generated content. From this perspective, I have tried to open a critical line to Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s thesis that the “death of the Author” in the context of AI-generated text opens new possibilities for language and meaning-making. I do not agree with Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s transfer of “personal” authorship qualities to abstract entities such as “language” and “text”. In my opinion, their philosophical position is problematic, and their defence of “unauthorized-authorship” or “impersonal-authorship” is misguided.
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