INTERFACE

–Journal of European Languages and Literatures



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EDITORIAL:

One year INTERFACE, a self-review

VASSILIS VAGIOS
National Taiwan University

As with the current issue of INTERFACE we enter the second year of its publication, we thought that it might be a good opportunity to take stock of the state of our journal up to this point; a kind of review of what we set out to achieve, what do we think we have we actually achieved, and in which areas we still need to improve.

Although the words to express it can appear to be complicated, in our minds our purpose was always very simple: we set out to establish a journal that would be inter/multi/trans-disciplinary (but for now on, for the sake of simplicity, we will call this nexus of scholarly concepts as simply interdisciplinary), and at the same time multi-lingual. As a journal we set out provide the opportunity for scholars that traditional academia would divide into separate departments (German, French, Spanish, Russian, Classics, etc.) to address their work across and beyond the walls of this divide. At the same time, we also rejected the idea of setting up a divide between Literary Studies and Language Studies, preferring instead to see these concepts as the terminal points in a continuum of Studying Discourse. Furthermore, we also refused to circumscribe the work to be welcome in INTERFACE by adjectives such as "theoretical" and "applied"; actually even the one boundary we initially felt that we would insist on, (namely, to accept only papers that deal with some manifestation of language), eventually it appeared to us to be still part of a continuum, since language is just one of the semiotic systems producing meaning in human life. Consequently, we decided to relax it in the case of special topic issues. Finally, we set English as a *lingua franca*, but we also recognized that some of the people who

have very interesting things to tell us, might not necessarily express themselves best in English (especially, as being located in East Asia, for very many of us English is a third or fourth language), and so we offered from the very beginning the opportunity for those who wish it to publish in German, French, Spanish or Russian also. Actually, since then our resources have increased, and starting from Issue 5, we will also accept papers in Italian.

Our offer to accept papers in other languages apart from English, so far has not been taken up by the community. So with the exception of a book review in Issue 2 and another one that appears in this issue, all other submissions we have received so far have all been in English. We are not sure whether this is because our colleagues do not need this facility, or because they are not aware that the facility exists. However, we intend to continue offering it and publicize it for the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, in other respects the offers we made to the scholarly community has been embraced in a way that we have found very satisfactory. The vast majority of the papers that appeared in INTERFACE either straddle traditional academic boundaries, or have strong relevance for fields beyond the field of their origin. Just as an indicative example one could mention the paper by Roberval Teixeira E Silva in Issue 1 regarding "silence in classroom". Written within the context of teaching Portuguese in Macao, it offers insights to anyone who is interested in teaching methodologies in any filed in most East Asian educational systems. Again, the article by Ihmku Kim in Issue 3 has a very strong theoretical orientation, but this theoretical orientation is very much concerned with the actual practice of the interpretation of literature. An example of movement in the opposite direction, from practice to theory, is provided by the article by Beatrice Cabau in Issue 1, when starting with the description of the application of a CLIL programme for teaching French she formulates important observations regarding the theory behind CLIL (which, not surprisingly, have repercussions for any language programme, not just French). Indeed, with the exceptions of the papers by I-Kai Jeng and Shunichiro Yoshida in Issue 2, none of the other ten papers we published in the first three issues of INTERFACE

could easily be placed in any particular category; as for these two papers that could be placed squarely to the discourses of European Philosophy and Latin Literature respectively, an open-minded reader could still use them easily as stimulus towards investigation on issues with which superficially they may appear unrelated (e.g. the paper on Latin could be significant for research on the relevance of totalitarian/ oppressive regimes to the development of metaphorical narratives/ways of expression).

Apart from the content targets, we also set qualitative targets: we wanted the articles we publish would be of high quality and that they would be recognized as such by the international scholarly community. So we made sure that during the double-blind peer review process we engage scholars that have demonstrated expertise on the topics dealt by our authors. Furthermore, thanks to the generous funding from National Taiwan University, we offer each and every reviewer an honorarium as an act of appreciation for devoting valuable time to the papers under consideration. Finally, we try to involve in the review process as many reviewers from outside Taiwan as possible, so that we ensure that our standards remain in contact with general international standards, and we feel particularly happy that of the 52 reviewers from whose services we benefited, 20 are located in 12 countries abroad (full details of the location and the nationality of the reviewers that co-operatedd with INTERFACE are given in Table 1). As a result of the high standards we set, and despite the fact that we do not try to achieve any particular rejection rate, we did not feel able to publish 15 of the 27 (i.e., around 56%) papers that were submitted to us.

Of course internationalization of a journal does not only mean a great amount of international reviewers; it also means a great amount of international authors. Here too, we feel happy by the rate of acceptance of the community: the papers we received were submitted by colleagues working in 8 countries and belonging to 11 nationalities (full details of the location and the nationality of the authors that submitted papers to INTERFACE, as well as of the authors whose papers we accepted for publication are given in Table 2).

INTERFACE, **Issues 1-3**		
	Reviewers by Location	Reviewers by Nationality
Taiwan	32	24
Hong Kong	1	1
Germany	4	6
Russia		3
Spain		1
USA	2	6
Japan	3	3
Korea	3	3
Italy	1	1
Portugal	1	1
UK	1	1
Singapore	1	
Australia		1
Czechia	1	2
Thailand	1	
Egypt	1	
Total	52	52

Table 1: Location and Nationality of INTERFACE reviewers

INTERFACE, Issues 1-3				
	Authors by Location		Authors by Nationality	
	Submitted	Accepted	Submitted	Accepted
Taiwan	12	7	7	4
Hong Kong	3	1	1	
Macao	3	1		
France			1	1
Germany			4	4
Brazil			1	1
Russia	1		2	
Spain			2	
Japan	3	1	3	1
Korea	3	1	3	1
Portugal			2	
Sweden			1	
Egypt	1	1		
China	1			
Total	27	12	27	12

Table 2: Location and Nationality of INTERFACE authors

We, the people working for INTERFACE, would like to thank the community for their warm embrace of our project and we will continue to strive towards maintaining the high standards of this publication. It seems that for the foreseeable future INTERFACE has settled in a pattern of issues alternating between general content and special topics. We have already announced that the topic of the fifth issue will be

"**Refugees and Exiles in European Languages and Literatures**", and the sixth issue will be a general issue; in the meanwhile, we are close to deciding a special topic for issue seven which we will announce in January. Furthermore, we are working towards expanding the international links of INTERFACE and we hope that we will be able to co-operate with more people from more countries in the very near future.

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False Variety: Plato's Fear of the Mass Media

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Abstract

Plato's criticisms of poetry in the Republic X have been compared by Alexander Nehamas to modern élitist criticisms of television in the 1970s and 80s. In his "Plato and the Mass Media" (1988), Nehamas explained that the poetry attacked by Plato —either Homer's epics or the celebrated tragedies performed in theatres— was in the form of "popular entertainment" in the cultural context of Athens in the fifth century B.C. The aim of my paper is not to endorse the élitist attitude toward popular entertainment. What I wish to argue is that the variety shown by media does not entail our free choices among the various items. One significant feature of the mass media revealed by Nehamas is that the *mimesis* (representation/imitation) in it is "transparent." The "transparent *mimesis*" is the representation which mirrors things simply according to how they appear to the audience. Due to the transparency, the work of popular entertainment "requires little or no interpretation." In this paper, I will explore the concept of the "transparent *mimesis*" in Plato and compare it with some views in contemporary aesthetics. On freedom, I will compare it with Adorno. As for the variety shown in the transparent *mimesis*, I will challenge the idea that Greek art is "realistic", by consulting the studies of aesthetics by Gombrich, Wollheim, and Halliwell. *Mimesis* resembles not simply real things, but things which appear to certain fixed points of views. In contrast with the popular impression that Plato is a variety-hater, my paper aims to show that Plato's attacks on the mimetic arts come from his defence of our free choices against the false variety. Plato's fear is not of variety, but of false variety. The false variety in media imposes simplified fixed points of view on us via "transparent *mimesis*" which constrains our perceptions. This deprives us of freedom in Plato's sense and of our perceptions of the real variety in the aesthetic sense.

Keywords: Plato, *mimesis*, perception, the *Republic*, aesthetics

False Variety: Plato's Fear of the Mass Media

Though the concept of "mass media" did not emerge until the developments and reflections of the modernity, one may assign Plato to the array of anti-mass-media people without much hesitation.[1] He is usually regarded as the enemy of the many, of democracy, and of the variety provided in the poetry, theatre,[2] painting or other visual arts —whatever the medium is— as long as it is multi-coloured.[3] In the book III of the *Republic*, in Plato's well-known "censorship" of poetry, Socrates[4] convinces his interlocutors to prefer the simpler to the multi-coloured, no matter what kind of topics come to the front, either the forms of performance of imitation (397d), or musical instruments (399c-e), or the modes and rhythms in music (400a). Later in book VIII, he complains about democracy and despises its variety as "a cloak in various colours" (557c). Even though the many-coloured cloak of poetry is a feature of the democratic society, Socrates in the dialogue associates poets not with democracy, but with tyranny. He believes that the poets' colourful performance not only seduce the society into democracy, but also drive it into tyranny (568b-c). Then the democratic society in which all desires are equally respected gradually turns out to be tyranny. Book IX describes how miserable the tyrannical life is. Eventually in book X, Plato notoriously banishes poets as well as all the mimetic artists (607b-c).

Along the line of thought, Plato seems to be a variety-hater in the eyes of most people. Indeed, according to his principal definition of justice, one should not interfere in more than one task (*Republic* 433b-d). Variety

1 The paper is a result of the research project MOST 104-2410-H-034 -055 -MY2. A first draft of this paper was read in the Sixth Symposium on European Languages in East Asia, 6-7 November 2015. The paper has benefited much from the conference. I am also very grateful to the reviewers of this journal for their valuable suggestions and careful corrections.

2 In ancient Greece, theatre is a form of the performance of poetry. The "ποίησις (poetry)" in Plato's discussion contains drama and the accompanying music.

3 This view is fully elucidated in Popper (1966) where Plato was treated as the chief enemy of the "Open Society".

4 In this paper, by "Socrates" I refer to the character in Plato's dialogues rather than the historical Socrates except otherwise mentioned.

seems to be an evil by this standard. Poetry provides variety. Seen from the angle of politics, his attacks on poetry are a political move which deprives citizens of free choices by an external control coming from the *polis* (city-state).

But it is not meaningful to label Plato as anti-mass-media. We are in a different cultural environment from where Plato stood. It is easy but futile to stick a tag on a thinker in the past from the point of view of our own time. Nowadays we are persistently exposed to the mass media. Many more people are influenced by the mass media than by Plato. Plato is not the main enemy of the openness or freedom in our cultural environment. On the contrary, the problem before us is the vast amount of information which we are fed, sometimes unwillingly, sometimes unconsciously, by the media.

The neuroscientist Maryanne Wolf has paid much attention to the problem which the media may produce. In her book on the development of our capacity of reading, *Proust and the Squid: The story and science of the reading brain*, Wolf impressively goes back to "Socrates' protests" against written words when the reading of written words became a new medium in ancient times (Wolf, 2007a). Wolf's idea corresponds well to Plato's distrust of written words (compared with *Phaedrus* 274b-278b). Besides, she is right to see that Socrates (the historical figure) and Plato are worrying that people think that they know things when they read written words, but actually they do not really know (cf. *Apology* 21a-22e). She associates this with a reflection upon our dependence on internet and digital sources in another article, "Socrates' nightmare" (Wolf, 2007b). The inference is based on a crucial discovery in her research: whenever a new medium comes into being, no matter what it is, it influences the functioning of our brain.

As Wolf observes, reflecting on Plato may break through what we have been accustomed to in our era. We are standing in the environment where new media are invented all the time. The multiplicity of media seems to imply variety. However, do we really enjoy free choices in the variety provided by the multi-coloured stuff, when we are buried by the numerous repeating messages sent by the numerous new-fangled mass

media?

In this paper, I argue that the seeming variety given by the mass media does not entail free choice among the various items. In contrast with the popular impression that Plato is a variety-hater, I will point out that Plato's attacks on poetry and the mimetic arts come from his defence of our free choices against the false variety, instead of the opposite. The underlying issue is *mimesis*[5] and its psychological influence. To disentangle this, in section 1, I will explore the concept of "transparent *mimesis*" in Plato put forward by Alexander Nehamas in his influential paper on Plato's reflections on the mass media. Then I will compare it with some views in the contemporary aesthetics. In section 2, I will compare Plato's "freedom" with Adorno's. In section 3, I will investigate *mimesis* deeper to challenge the idea that Greek art is "realistic," by consulting the aesthetics studies in Gombrich, Wollheim, and Halliwell. *Mimesis* is resembling not simply real things, but things which appear to certain fixed points of view. Through the problematic *mimesis*, the new-fangled media do not really entail variety. They merely give seeming variety. Furthermore, the false variety in media imposes certain simplified and fixed points of view on us, by the means of the "transparent *mimesis*" which constrains our perceptions. It becomes the new external control over us. This is the issue before us.

1 Transparent *Mimesis*

In his "Plato and the Mass Media" (1988), Nehamas compared Plato's criticisms of poetry in *Republic* X to the intellectuals' criticisms of television in the 1970s and 80s. He tried to explain that the poetry attacked by Plato —either Homer's epics or the celebrated tragedies performed in theatres— was not poetry as a fine art, but in the form of "popular entertainment" in the cultural context of Athens in the fifth

5 μίμησις, representation/imitation. "Imitation" is the traditional translation. Halliwell reminded us of its narrowness (Halliwell, 2002, pp. 13-14). In the case of visual arts, "representation" seems more proper, but may lead to different discussions than that of *mimesis* (pp. 344-346). Pappas considered the etymological reason (based on the research of mimic performance and *mimesis* in Sörbom, 1966) and suggested that "imitation" "used with awareness" is a "serviceable translation" (Pappas, 2015). In this paper, I will use the Latinized form of this word in most places.

century B.C. One significant feature of this kind of medium is that the *mimesis* in it is "transparent." That is, one can directly see through what is represented in the work without appealing to any assistance of expertise, knowledge and so on. The transparency makes the work seem to call no further interpretation, and makes us mistakenly accept that it "requires little or no interpretation" (Nehamas, 1988, pp. 225-226).

With Nehamas' points, I partly agree and partly disagree.

The concept of "transparent *mimesis*", as Nehamas discovered, explained the similarity between Plato's criticisms of poetry and contemporary criticisms of popular entertainment delivered via the mass media. However, does this convince us to give up the various choices which the popular entertainment provides? Nehamas' interpretation implies an élitist distinction between "fine art" and "popular entertainment." The distinction is questionable in at least two aspects. First, as Halliwell notices, Nahamas' interpretation requires "a recognition that the differences between that culture and modern democratic societies means that Athenian drama cuts across the sort of distinction between 'highbrow' and 'popular' that is now so familiar (and controversial)" (Halliwell, 2002, p. 91). "[T]he experience of tragedy affects 'even the best of us'" (ibid.). The audience of the poetry attacked by Plato covers "τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς (the decent people)" and "οἱ … βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν (the best people among us)" (*Republic* 605c), namely, the cultural élitists in the Athenian society. Second, the distinction presumes an arbitrary preference of "fine art" to the "mass art" directed at the many in the democratic society. Besides, it is questionable whether the popular entertainment provided by Greek arts can be counted as mass media, given the problematic concept of the "mass" and the differences among the different forms of media.

However, Nehamas' interpretation is contributory. It reveals something common to the Greek arts in Plato's mind and the mass media. The real issue here probably does not lie in the concept of mass media confined by its modern sense, but the psychological influence of the "transparent *mimesis*" involved. What psychological power common to

the digital media, TV and Greek arts, is Plato's real fear? Neuroscience has provided a description of the phenomena of the influences on the brain by the changes of medium (Wolf, 2007a and 2007b). What would be the philosophical explanation for these phenomena?

According to Nehamas' explanation, the "transparent *mimesis*" is defined by "the features that make it the particular representation it is, solely from the object it represents, and which we can see directly through its representation" (Nehamas, 1988, p. 219). In other words, the products or artworks of *mimesis* which are transparent would be as identical in appearance as possible to what they are representing or imitating.

"Art is *mimesis*" is commonly attributed to Plato. The main textual source lies in *Republic* X, where Plato expounds the mimetic aspect of painting, and then applies it to poetry. We are told in *Republic* X that painting is "mirroring" things. It is *mimesis*, not real things, and thus far from true knowledge (*Republic* 596d-e). So is poetry (598d-601b). The *mimesis* targeted by Plato, according to the metaphor of mirror, fits what Nehamas calls "transparent *mimesis*." Nehamas then appeals to passages where Plato emphasizes that the mimetic arts copy only objects' apparent appearances (598b4, 600e7-601a7, 600e3-601b1). The transparent *mimesis* catches only the surface, but leaves the physical or psychological "depth" untouched (Nehamas, 1988, pp. 219-220).

This is very different from what we thought about Greek arts. Copying the appearances, being as most identical in appearances as possible, "mirroring" things —is it art? This is the contribution of Nehamas' paper. He clarified that our concept of the fine art came very lately (compared with Plato's time) in the eighteenth century (Nehamas, 1988, p. 216). We cannot apply our concept of fine art to the arts criticized by Plato.[6] There was no distinct category for art in the cultural context of

6 Thus Nehamas could reply to Halliwell's comment cited above (2002, p. 91) that he has made the clarification, though the rest of Nehamas' discussion appears to presume the distinction between "fine art" and the popular entertainment for the masses. I am not getting into an ideological debate on high art and mass art. The point is how the artworks for the mass affect us. And "the best people among us" (*Republic* 605c, cited above) can be reasonably included in us (the mass).

Plato's criticisms. Plato's criticisms, according to his worries about "the direct connection between our reactions to poetry and our reactions to life" (Nehamas, 1988, p. 218), are not directed at the inspiring Greek tragedies and fine arts in our eyes, but to the transparent *mimesis* in popular entertainment. Nehamas believes that the performance of tragic poetry in the fifth century B.C. was extremely "realistic". In what sense would Greek art be realistic? The tragic actors on stage wore masks, were speaking a poetic language not used by any actual speaker of the language in real life. What made these representations appear "real" to Athenians? They appear "real" only if the many accept them to be like the real. The speedy growth of the size of audience helped in forming the "realistic" appearance.[7] The audience was more like the audience of mass entertainment (Nehamas, 1988, p.223).

Let us turn our attention to the term "mass." Nehamas (following Peter Walcot) applies the term "mass" to the large audience of Attic drama. Strictly speaking, the large audience in the ancient Athenian theatre is not a "mass." The concept of "mass" is tightly linked to the mass technology in the modern industry. Automation in the modern industry, including the cultural industry, makes it possible to produce and deliver the products, either of art or of popular entertainment, to the "mass" in its strict sense. Here is the definition of the "mass artwork" by Carroll (1997, p. 190):

> x is a mass artwork if and only if 1) x is a multiple instance or type artwork 2) produced and distributed by a mass technology, 3) which artwork is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (e.g. its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, for

7 In his discussion, Nehamas used the term "realistic" in its commonest sense. That is, to resemble its subject-matter in the physical world as best as possible. But the details of the physical subject-matter cannot be exhausted. What the supposed "reality" represented in the *mimesis* is controversial (cf. Gombrich, 1977; Wollheim, 1998; Halliwell, 2002). One may ponder on a more recent account of Greek realism: "by realism I mean the choice of specific, historic or everyday life scenes that are familiar to the artists and their patrons and treated in such a way as to offer the impression of the familiarity of lived experience" (Csapo, 2010, p. 2). There must be some choices of scenes by the artists. The impression of the familiarity is dependent on the viewpoints shared by the artists and their audience. The issue will be discussed further in section 3 below.

the largest number of relatively untutored audiences.

Although the Attic drama was available to a large audience, free and slave, old and young, it was still a limited number of people compared with the "mass" after the mass technology of modern industry appeared. We can hardly consider each performance in the ancient Athenian theatres simply as an instance or token of a Greek tragic poem, even when the performance is a realistic representation. However, the phenomenon of tragic reperformance in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. largely increased the size of the audience exposed to popular plays.[8] Theatre became a sort of industry. One could pay the *polis* for a franchise of the theatre and profit from the collection of admission fees (Csapo, 2010, p. 83). The spread of reperformances also influenced the production of drama-related vase-paintings (ibid. pp. 1-37; Finglass, 2015, pp. 219-221). Theatre "had at least an impulse to expand into the mass-entertainment industry we know it to have been by the end of the Classical period" (Csapo, 2010, p. 83).

Furthermore, if we compare Carroll's definition with Nehamas' interpretation, one thing is common between the contemporary mass art on the one side, and the Greek arts attacked by Plato on the other side. In Carroll's words, it is the "accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, for the largest number of relatively untutored audiences." In Nehamas' discussion, in front of the very broad audience of Greek drama, the transparent *mimesis*, in the form of popular entertainment, is "inherently realistic." That is, it is intended "to represent reality without artifice, without mediation and convention" (Nehamas, 1988, p. 223). It represents a seeming "reality" to the popular audience and seems to require no further interpretation. Although mediation and convention are still within the representations, the transparent *mimesis* prevents the audience from being aware of it (p. 224). Routine makes the audience swallow the representations even more easily, "in the absence of criticism

8 During the last decades, the dogma that Greek plays were written for single performances has been challenged and gradually outweighed by the discussion of reperformances (Lamari, 2015a, pp.181-182). Both tragedies and comedies were re-performed in Plato's time. The institutionalization of dramatic reperformances is in fourth century, but reperformances might begin to occur during Aeschylus' lifetime and increasingly become popular in the fifth century (Lamari, 2015b, pp. 189-206; Finglass, 2015, pp.211, 217-218).

and interpretation" (pp. 229-230). We may synthesize this with Carroll's definition. The transparent *mimesis* requires minimum effort from the side of audience. It makes the artwork accessible by the unqualified mass, but at the same time, deprives the mass of the opportunity to see into the surface of the work and think. The mass is fed with stuff not by choice, but by its accessibility. What results from the low requirement of effort is the loss of our capacity to make free choices.

2 The Loss of Freedom

Nehamas is original in interpreting the similarity between Plato's aesthetics and the twentieth century's reflections on the mass media by the "transparent *mimesis*." But "transparency" in representation is not a new term in twentieth-century aesthetics, particularly when we take the "mass" in modernity into consideration. Adorno has criticized the transparent representation in films. For him, fiction always leaves distance from the physical presence of things and people in the empirical world; while "a film is realistic, the semblance of immediacy cannot be avoided" (Adorno, 1967, p. 200). Adorno is a philosopher who argues for autonomous art against the decline of taste in the time of mass reproduction. He inspiringly pointed out, in the decline of musical taste, that "[r]esponsible art adjusts itself to criteria… But otherwise, no more choices are made; the question is no longer put, and no one demands the subjective justification of the conventions." The human right to a "freedom of choice" has been sacrificed for the commercial sake (Adorno, 2001, pp. 29-30). In his remarks on the loss of free choices due to the culture industry, Adorno rightly recalled Plato's attitude toward poetry in the *Republic*. He considered Plato's censorship of poetry in book III of the *Republic* as a complaint about "declining taste" (Adorno, 2001, p. 31).

The term "declining taste" sounds a complaint from cultural élitists. Both Plato and Adorno may attract this kind of criticism. However, Adorno will not accept the label of élitist, for his concern is humanity

rather than élitism. What is more worthy of investigating is the freedom[9] which Plato and Adorno are trying to defend, the freedom which every human being equally has the right to earn. It is not limited to the selected élitists. When we turn to the books IX and X in the *Republic*, it will be shown that Plato's complaint of multi-coloured representations is also related to the loss of free choices, in terms of his psychology.

In *Republic* IX, the elements of the soul[10] are described as three creatures enclosed in a human being: a many-headed beast, a lion, and a person (588b-e). They stand for the appetitive element, the spirited element and the reasoning respectively (cf. *Republic* IV, 436a-441c). If one fattens up the many-headed beast, but starves the inner person, the inner person will be drawn by the other two creatures, and they will fight among themselves (589a). Then the inner person will be unable to be in control, but become a slave of the other creatures (590c). It means that the agent —the whole person— has incapacitated the divine ruler within herself (590d). Plato implicitly identifies the inner person, representing the reasoning element in the soul, as our true self. The metaphor explains the slavery in the tyrannical person analysed a bit earlier in the book IX. This slavery is developed from the freedom in democracy. Plato does not admit of the freedom in democracy as freedom, either. As mentioned in the introductory section, Plato despises the variety in democracy as "a cloak in various colours" (cf. *Republic* VIII, 557c). It does not entail freedom. Quite the reverse: when the reasoning element which can really make the choice has been enslaved, the whole person is enslaved. The soul in this kind of situation is not free (578c-d) because it is unable to do what it really wants to (578e).

In *Republic* X, Plato compares *mimesis* with the real thing: we may look

9 Plato is concerned about "freedom," but not in the sense developed in the modern political thoughts like that in Rousseau, Locke or Mill. "Freedom" in Plato is not based on individuals' rights, but more related to "self-mastery." This can be clearly seen in the progressive discussion on freedom in *Republic* VIII to IX (562e ff.). The strong connection between freedom and self-mastery is highlighted in the final pages of book IX. Only when one has her/his own inner ruler (ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ), we may let her/him "free" (ἐλεύθερον, 591a3). A similar line of thought can be found in Plato's earlier dialogue *Gorgias* (see Socrates' argument against Callicles, esp. at 491d-e). In his final work *Laws*, he notes that Athenians are good "not because of compulsion" (642c8), and considers the *polis* with inner harmony as "free" (ἐλευθέραν, 693b4), in contrast with Persian monarchy or Athenian democracy which is spoiled by questionable freedom (694a-702b). These reflect the same concern. The "inner" ruling or self-mastery needs to be understood in the context of Plato's psychology. More discussion below.

10 ψυχή (*psuchē*). In Plato, it may refer to the soul, the mind or the psychological entity.

at an object from the side or the front, or from anywhere else; it looks different, but stays the same (598a-b). The passage points out the main difference between the product of *mimesis* and the real object. In other words, the real thing has different appearances to its viewers, while the painter's "mirroring" of things is a single appearance without depth. On the other hand, Plato mentions that multiple appearances of the real thing require our capacity of reasoning, calculating and measuring, which is the only rational element in the soul (602d-e). Therefore, the rational element is by definition the capacity which helps the agent to make a choice among the appearances. In this context, the evil in *mimesis* is its corrupting effects on the inner state of the soul. It fattens the non-rational elements and weakens the capacity of making choices.

One may argue that non-rational choices are still choices made by the person. Is it legitimate to identify the agent by the inner person which is merely the rational part of the entire person? Why should we define the freedom of the agent by the freedom of the rational element in the soul?

Stalley appeals to the famous distinction of two orders of desires drawn by Frankfurt, to explain the freedom in Plato's sense. The second order desires refer to the desires of desires. For example, drug-addicts seem to do what they want. But there are "unwilling addicts" who desire the drugs with the first order desire, but detest their addiction to drugs with their second order desire (Stalley, 1998, p. 151; cf. Frankfurt, 1971, pp. 9-10 and 12). The unwilling addicts are not "free" even if they successfully obtain the desired drugs. On the contrary, they are not free because they are controlled externally by the drugs. Freedom in Plato's sense is not the realisation of all desires. His freedom means to be free from the control of non-rational desires which are unable to deny external attractions. The capacity of making choices lies in the rational element in the soul. A weak reasoning element will lose its capacity to choose, and thus be incapacitated to make a free choice, even if there are various appearances in front of it.

For Plato, the loss of freedom is not a deprivation from without. It happens in the soul. It is caused by the loss of our psychological capacities which are influenced by the dubious information from without, including the

mimetic arts. Plato's fiercest attacks against poetry are in *Republic* X, where he attacks poetry not only because it is *mimesis*, but also because of its corrupting psychological effects (605b, c). According to Plato, the "mirroring" of things, namely the Nahamas-called "transparent *mimesis*," corrupt our souls by weakening the psychological capacity of making free choices.

The "transparency" in mimetic art, either in the form of popular entertainment in our time or in the form of popular tragedies in ancient Athens, has its psychological effects. It fattens the irrational elements and weakens the reasoning element which originally has the chance to help us to be free. As Adorno has noticed, it is indeed questionable whether there is a freedom of choice when one likes a commercial piece (Adorno, 2001, p. 30). For example, in front of us, there may be colourful items, say, mobile phones of a new colour and a new shape, and even with a label of being "unique." We swallow the message of "being unique" even though thousands or millions of phones are of the same colour and shape, produced by mass technology in the age of the industrial automation. The few giant companies are in control. All choices we may have are restricted by the commercial mechanism. We accept the message that my phone is "unique" or the belief that it will make me "unique." "Being unique" —such an opposite idea to routinization— has become a routine, and in "absence of criticism and interpretation", in Nehamas' words.

3 The False Variety

How actually does the transparency in *mimesis* corrupt our psychological capacity of making free choice in this way? We simply see and hear and perceive the various products of *mimesis*. Since it is transparent, we can see things behind it. If the transparency leads us to see the variety in the real world, why can't it enrich our perceptions and become a good training of our capacities?

The problem is that the variety in it is false.

The false variety is prompted by the transparent *mimesis* in the media. The "transparency," as it seems, is created by the realistic representation as mentioned in section 1 above. But what is the "reality" the realistic Greek artworks represent? It is widely admitted that Greek arts are realistic *mimesis*. But to represent the real things is not as apparent as at the first look.

In the *Cambridge Introduction to the History of Art*, the author tells us that since the seventh century B.C., representing stories as lively as possible had become what the painters are concerned with (Woodford, 1982, pp. 41-43). Down to the fifth century, the technique of red-figure vase-painting allowed painters to depict their subject-matters in more detail. Furthermore, the painters started to create the illusion of three-dimensional objects on the two-dimensional flat surface. Thus they could represent the figures realistically in space (Woodford, 1982, pp. 48-50). This matches Plato's distinction between the product of *mimesis* and the physical object at *Republic* 602d-e: the painter is "mirroring" things in appearance seen from a single point of view, while the multiple appearances of the real thing are calling for our capacity of reasoning which is attributed to the rational element in the soul in Plato. However, the main part of the extant Greek paintings is vase-painting. Vase-painting is not on a flat surface. The shape of a vase is sometimes a tool to express the different views or stages of the scene which the painter aims to depict. Probably it is not the case that "Plato *ever* has vases in mind when he refers to painting" (Halliwell, 2002, p. 135 n.47, italic original). Still, the connection of vase-painting and the stages of the theatrical scene should be taken into consideration. It leads the *mimesis* in vase-painting back to the theatrical performance of poetry which is Plato's main target in *Republic* X.

Zeuxis is typically taken as the representative painter of Greek "realistic" art (cf. Moss, 2007, p. 422 n. 13). The story of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius is legendary, but still conveys the idea that Greek art is realistic. In the legend, Zeuxis' painting of grapes deceives the birds and Parrhasius' painting of curtains deceives Zeuxis the artist (Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 35.36). The paintings in this story seem to be

painted on the flat surface. Both their works represented physical things in a vivid way, by illustrating the three-dimensional object on the two-dimensional flat surface. Both looked as close to real things as possible. Both were works of transparent mimesis.

Zeuxis was Plato's contemporary. His name is mentioned by Plato as the representative of the painter (*Gorgias* 453c-d).[11] According to Pliny and Quintilian, Zeuxis stole Apollodorus' technique of representing light and shade, namely *skiagraphia* (σκιαγραφία, shadow-painting).[12] *Skiagraphia* is probably also applied on scene-paintings and perspective paintings.[13] Plato adopts this technical term to equip his argument on banishing the poetry (*Republic* 602d). The advantage of this skill is its power of *mimesis*. "Besides this accuracy of imitation, many of the works of Zeuxis displayed great dramatic power" (Smith, 1873). Once again painting is connected to the theatre. The dramatic power is what Plato is concerned with.

An interesting comment on *mimesis* comes from the art historian Gombrich. "[A]t the time he [Plato] wrote, *mimesis* was a recent invention" (Gombrich, 1977, p. 99). Gombrich as an art historian was attempting to establish a coherent explanation for the process of forming schemata and corrections in the whole history of art. He agreed that the *mimesis* which looked identical to the object in appearance was what Plato argues against. But he challenged the idea of "realistic" Greek art. "To create that realm of *mimesis* to which Plato objected, the Greek artists, like any artists, needed a vocabulary which could only be articulated in a gradual learning process" (Gombrich, 1977, p. 114). Gombrich agreed that "Plato was right… that something had been sacrificed," because in the *mimesis* of Greek painting, it is a "reduction to one moment" and "one angle of view" (p. 118). In other words, *mimesis* in Greek art could

11 Zeuxippus of Heraclea at *Protagoras* 318b-c probably refers to the same painter.

12 Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 35.36 and Quintilian 12.10 §4. For a further description of the technique, see Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 35.11.

13 Cf. Liddell, Scott & Jones, 1940, pp. 1609-1610. The perspective is usually taken as a way of representing things most objectively. But the perspective in Greco-Roman paintings is different from what we are familiar with after Renaissance. For example, a bowl's upper rim is usually depicted by a curve projecting further from the horizontal axis than its lower rim (Newall, 2010, p. 94). This means that the "realistic" effect even in the perspective is intertwined with a certain convention.

not simply copy real things. They were creating the things which looked "real" only if the audience (and Plato) share the same vocabulary with the *mimesis*-makers.

Consider this within the discussion of the transparent *mimesis*. Halliwell applied Nehamas' term "transparency" in his re-evaluation of Aristotle's *mimesis* (Halliwell, 1990, p. 327). By his assessment, Aristotle's view of *mimesis* involves "as much a sense of artistic media and their properties, as of art's imaginative contents." This is different from the "Platonic transparency" (ibid.). In his more recent work, Halliwell still maintains that the contrast between Plato's approach to *mimesis* and Aristotle's is "the radical difference between a dominant belief in the 'transparency' of *mimesis* and Aristotle's dual-aspect conception of artistic representation" (Halliwell, 2002, pp. 175-176). However, surely Plato is "not simply blind" to the creative artistic aspect of *mimesis* (Halliwell, 1990, pp. 328). When Plato says painting is "mirroring" things (*Republic* 596d-e), is it simply "mirroring" things? The craftsman of *mimesis* produces all living things, the sky and the earth, and the gods and everything in the sky, and also the things under the earth in Hades (596c). The gods and the things in Hades are not what can be seen. How can a painter produce them, even merely in appearance, simply by "mirroring" them?

How can a painter produce *mimesis* of invisible things? Due to the limits of visibility in the surface, Wollheim argued from the side of the spectator, that the perception of representation is a "seeing-in" with the "permeability to thought" (Wollheim, 1998, p. 224). For him, there is no problem to represent invisible things. But he insisted that *trompe l'oeil* paintings are not representations (Wollheim, 1998, p. 217). This is consistent with his "two-foldness" account of our perceptions of artworks (Wollheim, 1998, p. 221). By the two-foldness, the subject-matter is different from the colours and shapes on the surface of artwork. *Trompe l'oeil* painting is the perfect example of "transparent *mimesis*." It is too transparent to form the two-foldness which invites effort of seeing-in in Wollheim's context, or of giving interpretations as

Nehamas said.[14] Actually no *mimesis* is simply "mirroring" things. The perfect transparent *mimesis* may impose a certain fixed point of view on us without being aware of. Then we are fed with a chosen seeming "reality." The "transparency" is a misleading medium which seems to lead us to see the subject-matter in the mimetic works; however, it holds us on the surface.

Plato treats Greek arts as *trompe l'oeil* paintings. In our eyes, it seems unfair. But in his time, the development of new techniques and media of *mimesis* might play the same role as *trompe l'oeil* works. It is just like magic (*Republic* 602c-d, where Plato uses the technical term *skiagraphia* in the Greek text). The *mimesis* in epic and tragic poetry affects us when we see and hear (603b). The psychological effects come to us through perceptions, while the perceptions come from multiple appearances. The phenomenon of dramatic reperformances started in the fifth century B.C. created more multiple appearances. They repeated and strengthened the perceptual impressions which were familiar to audiences.[15] Reperformances of tragedies and comedies did not only occur in theatres, but also in visual arts. Finglass (2015, pp. 219-221) points out the contributions to reperformances made by vase-paintings in the fourth century, including vases from south Italy and Sicily. Some reflect reperformances of Sophocles. Csapo (2010, pp. 7-8) notes the "unusual" and "unnatural" hair-lines, faces, heads depicted on an Attic red-figured column krater in Basel dated around 500–490 B.C. The unusual and unnatural details show that the painting was depicting not mythical imagination, but actors and dramatic performance which were familiar to ancient Greeks. In addition to vase-paintings, Csapo (2010, pp. 13-15) also analysed two relief-fragments as examples of reperformances. The valuable researches on reperformances provide a more coherent story about Greek mimetic arts and its contemporary

14 The difference is that Wollheim emphasized "[r]epresentation is perceptual" (1998, p. 226), while Nehamas did not. But the perceptions are permeated by thought in Wollheim (p. 224). They also do so in Plato. Plato draws perceptions into the side of δόξα (belief, opinion or judgement). The psychological power comes through visual perception, and then the irrational element "forms belief" (δοξάζον) (*Republic* 602c8, 603a1-2; cf. *Theaetetus* 151d-187a, esp.152b). There are beliefs mixed in our perceptions of *mimesis*.

15 Also see notes 7 and 8 above.

critics like Plato and Aristotle.[16]

Plato is watchful of the multiple appearances reproduced by these mimetic arts. The same things appear different from different point of views. It is the time to call for the rational element of the soul (*Republic* 602e). However, the transparent *mimesis* calls for no further interpretation, because it only copies the surface-appearance from one single point of view (cf. 598a-b). The multiple appearances of the real thing have been fixed into a single point of view of the poet or painter or any *mimesis*-maker.

The "realistic" representation has always enclosed some opinions within it. Besides, to make the work popular to the mass, understandable with minimum effort, the opinions enclosed usually only repeat the given conventions, based on the impressions of familiarity. The single point of view may be dressed in colourful variety. But the variety is false. It has limited our freedom of choice via the perceptions perceived in certain limited ways. Our perceptions are constrained to see the seeming reality of a certain conventional point of view. Because of the transparency, we take the simplified reality as real, without waking our soul to make a real choice.

Therefore I call for reconsideration of the kind of comment that "in contrast to Plato's constriction of artistic imagination in the interests of the supreme values of the soul and the State, the Aristotelian conception of *mimesis* is inherently liberal" (Halliwell, 1990, p. 331). Plato argues in favour of liberty. But for Plato, liberty cannot be given. As Stalley noted, in the analogy of the Cave, the education is "a process of liberation" (Stalley, 1998, p. 147; cf. *Republic* 514a-519d). Liberation for Plato needs to be free from the fixed conventional views and the given prejudices. It is to liberate our psychological capacity of making choice. The seeming variety of appearances provided in the transparent *mimesis* narrows our perceptions and separates us from real variety. We do not choose, but seem to choose when we are given the simplified, limited and narrowed

16 A reference particular to Plato's *Republic* in Finglass, 2015, p. 209. References to Aristotle and Plato in Csapo, 2010, pp. 118-119 and 128.

choices. Plato's fear is not of variety, but of false variety. As we lose the real variety, we lose freedom. This, I believe to be what concerns us, as well as Plato.

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Linguistic Integration Policy and its Impact on the Construction of Language Identity: The Vietnamese Migrant Community in Czechia

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Abstract

In the 1970s and 1980s the Vietnamese arrived in Czechoslovakia as a group of guest-workers. According to the census in 1985, there were 19,350 Vietnamese living in the Czech territory (Heroldová & Matějová, 1987), but the number decreased to approximately 8,000 by 1994 (Mladá Fronta Dnes, 8th October 1994). However, based on the census data from CZSO (Czech Statistical Office) in 2014, due to changes in the political and economic environment, the number of Vietnamese in Czechia increased remarkably from 18,210 in 2001 to 52,612 in 2011. Nevertheless, even this figure greatly underestimates the real number of Vietnamese in the Czech Republic, mainly due to substantial illegal migration. According to CZSO, the Vietnamese community constituted 12.5% of immigrant population in Czechia in 2014, the third-biggest migrant community in this territory. This paper sets out to explore the role of current linguistic integration policy in the construction of language identity, mainly related to the migration of language communities in the period of globalization in Central and Eastern Europe contexts, by examining the case of a non-European language community, Vietnamese, in Czechia. The data served for discussion in this paper consider censuses and surveys conducted by several different researchers and official state bodies. The conclusion of this paper emphasizes the fact that the identity construction of Vietnamese and their second generation is developing reversely mainly due to two reasons: their internal cultural isolation and an education level which is supposed to be influenced by the current linguistic integration policy.

Keywords: migration, integration, language policy and planning, Vietnamese, Czech

Linguistic Integration Policy and its Impact on the Construction of Language Identity: The Vietnamese Migrant Community in Czechia

Linguists and philosophers have traditionally identified the fundamental functions of language as communication and representation. Language is used to understand the world around us, to represent the reality in our minds, and to communicate with others. In a multilingual society, the mother tongue holds a special role. According to Joseph (2004, p. 185), "the mother tongue is central to the construction of the speaker's linguistic identity. The mother tongue is itself a 'claim' about national, ethnic or religious identity (or any combination of the three) that speakers may make and hearers will certainly interpret." However, the question here raised is whether one's mother tongue can be maintained the same or is changeable. Skutnabb-kangas (1999, p. 55) considers that "you are born into a specific ethnic group, and this circumstance decides what your mother tongue will initially be. But what happens later to your ethnicity, your identity, and your language(s) and how they are shaped and actualized is influenced by economic and political concerns and by your social circumstances and later life. These things also influence to what extent you are aware of the importance of your ethnicity and your mother tongues and the connection between them." His argument implies that external circumstances and internal personal factors may bring influences on shaping people's linguistic identity.

Global mobility nowadays brings high numbers of migrants into many countries, and at the same time forces governments to face the problems which a multilingual society may have. One of the most important problems is how to integrate the whole society, and further to create a sound social circumstance for all people. According to Skutnabb-kangas (1999, p. 42), a successful linguistic integration policy must accomplish the goals of "high levels of multilingualism; a fair chance

of achieving academically at school; and strong, positive multilingual and multicultural identity and positive attitudes toward self and others".

The main goal of this paper is to investigate the construction of linguistic identity of the Vietnamese migrant community in Czechia, based on the data collected from censuses and surveys conducted by different researchers and official state bodies. It is assumed that the current Czech linguistic integration policy has an impact on the formation of linguistic identity, especially for its second generation, who have a good knowledge of Czech, with most of them being well-educated. In this paper, first, historical background and general information about the Vietnamese migrant community in Czechia will be briefly introduced; second, EU approaches for linguistic integration and current Czech linguistic integration policy will be presented. This will be followed with a discussion of the linguistic identity construction of the Vietnamese migrant community and their second generation in this territory.

1 Vietnamese migrant community in Czechia

According to data from the Czech Statistical Office (i.e. CZSO) in March 2014, the immigrants to this territory were mainly Slovakian, Ukrainian, and Vietnamese. From Table 1 below, it is an interesting observation that of all non-EU states, Vietnamese is the third major migrant community in the Czech Republic, with its population increasing from 18,210 in 2001 to 52,612 in 2011.

"The first groups of Vietnamese arrived in the Czech Republic as a consequence of the 1955 agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Vietnamese Democratic Republic" (Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003, p. 213), the renowned international program among socialist/communist countries in the 1950s (Drbohlav & Dzúrová, 2007, p. 73). The number of Vietnamese moving to Czechoslovakia increased gradually. By the beginning of the 1980s, approximately 30,000 resided in the territory of Czechoslovakia (Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003, p. 213). The Vietnamese arriving in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s were mostly guest-workers,

mainly to fill some gaps in the Czechoslovakian labor market. In 1981, two-thirds of the Vietnamese in this territory were workers (Drbohlav et al., 2004). According to Drbohlav and Dzúrová (2007, p. 73), judging the time of arrival of each Vietnamese group in Czechoslovakia, there were "mediators" who had come years ago to greatly monitor, politically, the stay of each newcomer. The "mediators" normally spoke Czech and were familiar with the local administration and legislation. They functioned seemingly as the interface between Vietnamese and Czech, though illegally. On the other hand, the existence of "mediators" brought less motivation for Vietnamese to learn more of the Czech language and culture. The Vietnamese community at that time was quite isolated in the territory. In 1986, the number of Vietnamese migrants started decreasing when economic reforms 'Doi Moi' started in Vietnam, but increased again after the Velvet Revolution in 1989 (Drbohlav & Dzúrová, 2007, p. 73).

National-ity	2001				2011			
	number	%	rate%		number	%	rate%	
			male	female			male	female
Foreigners in total from	124,668	100.0	53.4	46.6	422,276	100.0	57.4	42.6
Slovakia	24,201	19.4	54.1	45.9	82,251	19.5	53.7	46.3
Ukraine	20,628	16.6	47.2	52.9	116,139	27.5	57.3	42.7
Vietnam	**18,210**	**14.6**	**61.4**	**38.6**	**52,612**	**12.5**	**58.9**	**41.1**
Russia	7,696	6.2	44.1	55.9	31,545	7.5	45.2	54.8
Poland	13,350	10.7	36.1	63.9	16,800	4.0	47.6	52.4

Table 1: Population of foreigners in the Czech Republic in 2001 and 2011 (Czech Statistical Office, 2014)

Nowadays, according to CZSO, the survey data focusing on the economic activities of foreigners in the Czech Republic in 2011[1] showed that 43.8% of the Vietnamese in the Czech Republic worked in

1 See: https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/20541803/170222-14.pdf/870a2cea-fe98-4b36-b7d0-cacf30b2a395?version=1.0

the field of wholesaling or retail. This ratio is relatively a higher number compared with the other foreign communities working in the fields of wholesale and retail in Czechia: 8.3% Slovakian, 6.2% Ukrainan, 16.2% Russian, and 7.2% Polish. Among economic activities, wholesaling or retail is the field in which the Vietnamese in Czechia have a plurality. The field with their second-highest ratio, 7.6%, of the Vietnamese population in Czechia is manufacturing industry. These numbers reveal that the main economic activities of the Vietnamese in Czechia are more labor-intensive. In fact, it seems that only the first generation of Vietnamese immigrants work in wholesaling, while most of the second generation work in other fields. According to Souralová (2014, p. 325), Vietnamese parents in Czechia, who primarily work in the labour market, may subject their second generation to a situation marked by considerable pressure and expectations. They do not want their children to follow in their parents' footsteps. As a result, the second generation dedicate themselves to reaching higher educational levels and intensive academic competition not only for their own good, but also under such expectations from their parents, hoping for a better economic status. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the result of the survey focusing on the economic activities of the Vietnamese in Czechia may be directly related to their educational level. Figure 1[2] reveals some useful facts.



Figure 1: Educational level of foreigners in the Czech Republic (Czech Statistical Office, 2011)

2 For the source see footnote 1.

In Figure 1, light blue represents the proportion of population who hold an elementary education level or lower while yellow indicates the proportion of population who hold some university education level. The result of this survey in 2011 shows that the education level of the Vietnamese in Czechia was relatively lower than those of other foreign communities: 46.1% had an elementary education level or lower, and only around 4.5% had some university education level.In this paper, it is claimed that the education level not only reflects on their economic activities, but also contributes as an important factor in their identity construction, which will be discussed further in the following sections.

2 Linguistic integration policy in Czechia after 2004

After WWII, from 1948 to 1989, Czechia was under the rule of the Communist Party. "Throughout this period, especially after the unsuccessful attempt in 1968 to liberate the country from Soviet influence, the Communist government emphasized the necessity 'to learn' from the Soviet Union. Principles of status management directed to ethnic community languages were strongly influenced by Soviet models" (Neustupný& Nekvapil, 2006). In 1977, the first directive related to the language education of children from a migrant background appeared: Council Directive 77/486/EEC (Hoffmann, 1991, p. 307); however, it was more of a formal method, not particularly being put into practice. Until the end of the Communist period, the problems of ethnic communities, including language education, were not given adequate attention. Until 1989, control and regulation of emigrating Czechs and the return migration of overseas Czechs were the main focus tackled by the government. However, the situation has slowly changed since the beginning of the present century.[3] The *Zákon ze dne 10.července 2001 o právech příslušníků národnostních menšin a o změně některých zákonů* (Law on the Rights of Ethnic Minorities and Amendment of Some Laws made on 10th July 2001) (No. 273/2001) appeared as the only basic legal instrument during that period; however, it was noteworthy only as a

3 From 1989, the immigrant community in Czechia has increased up to 406,000 registered migrants in 2011, about 4.1% of the total population at that time, with the exception of decreases in 2000 and 2009 (CZSO, 2011).

distinction mainly between the majority and the minorities (Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2006). The key role in the change of the ethnic situation was the entry of the Czech Republic into the EU in 2004, within the EU enlargement.

In 2005, right after the EU enlargement, the 3rd Summit of Heads of States and Government of the Council of Europe's 46 member states took place in Warsaw. The Summit Declaration was committed to ensuring that cultural diversity would become a source of mutual enrichment and to protecting the rights of national minorities and the free movement of persons:

> In order to develop understanding and trust among Europeans, we will promote human contacts and exchange good practices regarding free movement of persons on the continent, with the aim of building a Europe without dividing lines…
>
> (Council of Europe, 2008a, p. 5)

This political Declaration was accompanied by an Action Plan, which proposed measures to ensure social cohesion and address the management of migration, including the acquisition of visa, residence, and citizenship. Presently, constant global migrations have brought the EU to face the growing difficulties of integrating its newcomers. The linguistic integration of adult migrants has accordingly been appointed to be the subject of two intergovernmental conferences, held in June 2008 and June 2010, under the auspices of the Steering Committee for Education (CDED) and the European Committee on Migration (CDMG). The 2008 conference focused more on the Council of Europe principles; the 2010 conference provided a forum, in which representatives of member states could discuss language requirements linked to entry, residence, and citizenship, and the quality of language courses, language tests, and alternative approaches to assessment.[4] These two conferences formally confirmed the emphasis on the host language requirement in linguistic integration for migrants. In other words, the host language requirement is becoming a significant element

4 See: www.coe.int/lang-migrants

of migration and integration approaches in most EU member states (Council of Europe, 2014). Consequently, there is a steady increase in the number of countries enacting legislation to make language proficiency a requirement for residence, citizenship, and even entry-visa.

According to the 2013 survey, the number of countries participating that reported a language requirement for entry, residence, or citizenship is increasing. Out of the 36 Council of Europe member states, 26 reported that adult migrants are legally required to take language courses and/or a language test for citizenship, 22 states for residence, and 9 states prior to entry; a total of 29 reporting that to take a language requirement is legally necessary for at least one of the three mentioned administrative situations (Council of Europe, 2014, p. 7).

The core principle of this language requirement is that language skills are an essential component of intercultural skills, an absolute for everyday life in a multicultural world. Further, migrants benefit from cultural diversity, to be involved in intercultural dialogue, to be informed, and to understand. Language skills and knowledge of the host society are necessary for adult migrants to be involved and be responsible to the host society, and further to contribute themselves to social cohesion (Council of Europe, 2008b, pp. 8-9). However, the question of the language requirements of several states in relation to admission, residence, or citizenship is becoming a major issue. Host language requirements seem to be the only and the most appropriate approach to achieve the goal of linguistic integration, although at the same time it possibly results in building up more distance from the ideal of multilingualism, which will be discussed more below.[5]

As mentioned, there are generally two approaches to the requirement of host languages: language courses and/or language tests. According to the Council of Europe Survey 2014, the number of states which officially provide language courses has increased from 9 for residency requirement and 6 for citizenship requirement in 2009 to 11 for residency

5 It is necessary to note here that more and more EU member states have already conducted impact studies of this language requirement for adult migrants. Until now, 14 states have reported the importance of such studies (Council of Europe, 2014).

requirement and 10 for citizenship requirement in 2013, regardless of whether the courses were compulsory or optional, free or fee-based (Council of Europe, 2014, p. 15). On the other hand, there is also a growing tendency of taking language and knowledge-of-society tests, in order to verify the degree of migrant language proficiency. Language requirements are usually expressed in terms of the proficiency levels of the Council of Europe's Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR).[6] From Table 2 below, it is obvious that the requirements for a specific CEFR level for residency and citizenship among EU member states have been increasing over the years.

CEFR level	2007		2009		2013	
	Residence	Citizenship	Residence	Citizenship	Residence	Citizenship
A1	2	1	2		3	
A2	2	1	1	1	5	4
B1		2	3	5	2	6
B2		2		1		
A1/A2	2		2			
A1/B1	2		1		2	1
A2/B1				1		2
A2/B2	1		1			

Table 2: Number of countries requiring different CEFR levels for residency and citizenship in 2007, 2009, and 2013 (Council of Europe, 2014, p. 18)

The level required for residency is mainly from A2 to B1, but for citizenship the required level is higher, mostly B1. This requirement of language proficiency creates some problems to be solved, mainly lying in the related language courses, textbooks, teachers, and so on.

6 CEFR: Common European Framework of Reference for Languages: Learning, Teaching, Assessment. 2001. Council of Europe/Cambridge University Press. Available on line: www.coe.int/lang

The Czech Republic has been a member of the EU since 2004. Growing flows of international migration complicate the language and cultural situation in this territory. Following the new amendment supporting linguistic integration in the Council of Europe, some changes have been conducted in Czechia. According to the Council of Europe (2008b, p. 17), migrants have the right to residence after an uninterrupted stay of five years in Czechia, and the right to citizenship after ten years. Under the amended law, migrants have to present a certificate of knowledge of the Czech language from January 2009. In 2009, the Czech Republic required level A1 of the Czech language for residency but in 2015 changed that to introduce a level A1 test for long-term stay and level A2 for permanent residence. For citizenship, the Czech Republic replaced the interview in 2008 to a level B1 test result from 2014. The government does provide optional Czech courses free of charge that make it possible for migrants to attain the level required by law, but surely the courses are conducted for limited hours. According to the Council of Europe (2014, p. 21), this measure is unique among the eastern European countries, while the other eastern European countries don't provide such courses for free.

Another important amended policy concerning the linguistic integration for children from a migrant background is free Czech language courses for all foreign pupils in primary schools. According to the research result carried out by Kostelecká and Jančařík (2014, p. 7), in 2009, 2010, and 2011, one of the most important factors significantly affecting the successful integration of children with a foreign mother tongue into the Czech primary school system is the ability to communicate in Czech. In 2012, Czech legislation was amended to ensure free preparation for entering the primary school system, including Czech language classes tailored to the needs of learners, extended to all foreigners (Kostelecká & Jančařík, 2014, p. 12). All in all, according to the new amended policy based on the idea of linguistic integration, it is apparent that the Czech Republic follows and adapts to the trend of learning the host language for migrants as it is one of the most important steps for integration.

Nevertheless, although learning the host language for migrants is one important step towards integration, there are still a lot of other measures

or ideas complementing this linguistic integration. As Grin (1995, p. 33) pointed out, "The present-day migrants are more likely, on average, to claim a right to maintain the language and culture of their native country in their new surroundings. This gives rise to a new category of minorities, who ground their legitimacy not in a historical connection with the piece of land on which they happen to live, but in a non-territorial right to the maintenance of cultural and linguistic identity." He further presented two well-known principles to implement linguistic rights by the authority of language plans and policies, which are the territorial principle and the personality principle (Grin, 1995). The former is tied to land. Individuals derive their linguistic rights from their communities' geographical location. The personality principle means that linguistic rights are granted to individuals, regardless of their location. Although there are obvious contrasts between these two principles, Grin (1995, p. 35) argues they can be seen as complementary, which is also supported in this paper. He claims that the countries conducting the personality principle could switch to the territorial principle, and vice versa, in order to realize multilingualism.

Linguistic rights should be considered basic human rights. Lack of linguistic rights, taking, for instance, the absence of the minor languages from school curricula, would possibly lead to the invisibility of minority languages. "Alternatively, minority mother tongues are constructed as nonresources, as handicaps which are believed to prevent minority children from acquiring the majority language so that it becomes in the interest of minority children to abandon them" (Skutnabb-kangas, 1999, p. 57). According to the present state of the linguistic integration policy in the Czech Republic, learning the host language is the most important approach to "successful" integration, regardless of the importance of mutual understanding, including the migrants' languages and cultures. That also implies the current linguistic integration policy tends to neglect these migrants' right to the maintenance of cultural and linguistic identity. One question arises: Does such a linguistic integration policy impact migrants in a territory, and on their second generation?

3 Ethnic identity and language identity of the Vietnamese in Czechia

According to the data shown by CZSO in 2014 June, i.e., Table 3, the percentage of the population which declares to hold single ethnicity was decreasing: 98.2% in 2001 to 73.1% in 2011. On the other hand, among them the percentage of population declaring themselves as Vietnamese increased a bit: 0.2% in 2001 to 0.3% in 2011.[7]

Ethnicity	2001		2011	
	total	%	total	%
Residents in total:	10,230,060	100.0	10,436,560	100.0
who claim to hold single ethnicity	**10,044,255**	**98.2**	**7,630,246**	**73.1**
Czech	9,249,777	90.4	6,711,624	64.3
Moravian	380,474	3.7	521,801	5.0
Silesian	10,878	0.1	12,214	0.1
Slovakian	193,190	1.9	147,152	1.4
Polish	51,968	0.5	39,096	0.4
German	39,106	0.4	18,658	0.2
Romany	11,746	0.1	5,135	0.0
Hungarian	14,672	0.1	8,920	0.1
Vietnamese	17,462	0.2	29,660	0.3
Ukrainian	22,112	0.2	53,253	0.5
Russian	12,369	0.1	17,872	0.2
Other	40,501	0.4	58,289	0.6
who claim to hold double ethnicities	**12,978**	**0.1**	**163,648**	**1.6**
Czech and Moravian			99,028	0.9
Czech and Slovakian	2,783	0.0	17,666	0.2
Czech and Romany	698	0.0	7,026	0.1

7 It is noted here in Table 3 that Moravians and Silesians are not immigrants. They are inhabitants of the parts of Czechia which have some historical genealogy.

Czech and German			6,158	0.1
Other combinations	9,467	0.1	33,770	0.3
others	**172,827**	**1.7**	**2,642,666**	**25.3**

Table 3: Ethnicities in the Czech Republic in 2001 and 2011 (Czech Statistical Office, 2014)[8]

As to language identity, according to the data shown by the Czech Statistical Office in 2011 March, i.e., Table 4 below, around 84.7% of the Vietnamese in the Czech Republic consider Vietnamese their mother tongue, 10.9% consider both Vietnamese and Czech their mother tongues, and only 3% claim the Czech language as their mother tongue.

State nationality	Selected mother tongue					
	Language	%	Language	%	Language	%
Slovakia	Slovakian	86.1	Czech & Slovakian	5.7	Hungarian	2.5
Ukraine	Ukrainian	75.7	Russian	11.5	Czech & Ukrainian	7.3
Vietnam	Vietnamese	84.7	Czech & Vietnamese	10.9	Czech	3.0
Russia	Russian	90.3	Czech & Russian	5.2	Other	2.6
Poland	Polish	80.5	Czech & Polish	13.8	Czech	2.8

Table 4: Mother tongues of foreigners in the Czech Republic through March 2011 (Czech Statistical Office, 2011)[9]

It is necessary to note that in this survey the heritage language is not mentioned. A heritage language is a language which is a minority language in a society, learned by the speaker as a child at home, but because of the influence from a dominant language, the speaker has better competence in the latter one. Since this survey does not take the heritage language into account, the referent of the mother tongue here may not be clear to the participants in this survey, especially for the second generation of these foreign communities in Czechia. However, the numbers in Table 4 still reveal some interesting phenomena: a

8 See: https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/narodnostni-struktura-obyvatel-2011-aqkd3cosup

9 See: https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/20541803/170222-14.pdf/870a2cea-fe98-4b36-b7d0-cacf30b2a395?version=1.0

relatively higher ratio of the Vietnamese population in Czechia considers Vietnamese their mother tongue while a quite low ratio considers the dominant language, Czech, their mother tongue.

There might be many reasons to support the data mentioned above. However, it is interesting that the ethnic identity of the Vietnamese community in Czechia is so strong, despite the fact that the related authorities put a great deal of effort into the work of integration especially after 2004. Certainly, there is no direct relation between the effects of integration and ethnic identity, but the isolation of the Vietnamese community in Czechia is well-known. According to Drbohlav and Dzúrová (2007, p. 88), "their isolation is supported by their very intensive 'internal', not 'external', social communication and perhaps also by their perceived cultural distance from the Czech majority population…They did choose a path that combines rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and solidarity." This statement might precisely explain the phenomenon, which can occur in almost all the small Vietnamese shops in this territory: the shop owners are always watching Vietnamese TV programs or listening to Vietnamese music when you enter the shop, or a small Buda is placed somewhere in a corner. The Vietnamese community until now still maintains its own cultural values, lifestyle, and even much internal solidarity in Czechia, although the community has existed in this society for more than half a century.

Another important factor that seems instrumental in immigrant inclusion into Czech society, particularly via cultural activities, is the existence of ethnic institutions. There are around ten registered Vietnamese associations working in this country; however, only a few are well-known (Drbohlav and Dzúrová, 2007, p. 75). One of them is the Association of Vietnamese Entrepreneurs (in Czech: *Svaz vietnamských podnikatelů*), established in 1992; in the same year, Vietnamese Association (in Czech: *Svaz Vietnamců*) was formed in Prague to protect the interests of the community. They have a branch in Ostrava. A new magazine *Bambus* was founded in 2003 (Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003, p. 214). Among these associations, there is one interesting phenomenon that the

language in use mostly is Vietnamese, no matter on their web pages or publications even though the Vietnamese language is still a lesser-used language in this territory. This phenomenon might reveal that the activities of these associations are still quite closed and isolated from the mainstream society.

Nevertheless, there is one particular association named Club Hanoi[10] (in Czech: *Klub Hanoi*). This association was founded in 2003 by some Czechs interested in the Vietnamese language and culture, including several Vietnamese students who were studying at the Faculty of Philosophy at Charles University in Prague. These Vietnamese founders belong to the 4.5% of the Vietnamese population who hold some university education level. The language in use at this association, i.e., their web pages and publications, is mainly Czech, not Vietnamese. The language they choose to communicate with each other and to the public is not their heritage language. The reason might be the image they want to build or the objects they intend to communicate with. Nevertheless, language choice is a pervasive phenomenon in multilingual societies, especially for their socially and economically marginalized groups, who tend to learn the mainstream language at the expense of their own. By choosing the language, first the language identity is implicitly conveyed; second, a larger socio-political context which shapes their choice of language is reflected.

This association, Club Hanoi, might represent the second generation of Vietnamese in Czechia: most of them were born in the Czech Republic and have a higher education level. They have very good knowledge of Czech, as Czech locals. According to the discussion in the previous paragraph, their language choice reveals their Czech identity, which is in contrast with the identity of the first generation of the Vietnamese migrants in the Czech Republic.

4 Further discussion

Regardless of proper understanding in depth of the nature, culture, and

10 The website of this association is: http://www.klubhanoi.cz/index.php

religion of migrants, the authorities hold the main principle of linguistic integration: good knowledge of the Czech language seemingly serves as the only gateway to integration. Additionally, it appears that successful inclusion into Czech society is connected to the assimilation mode, which might bring some negative effects, not only to the Vietnamese community, but also to the host society.

For the host society, according to Neustupný and Nekvapil (2003, p. 214), the attitude the public holds towards the Vietnamese community is disparate. Pejorative descriptors such as "cane people" and "reed warblers" are sometimes used to refer to the Vietnamese people in Czech society. A survey conducted by the public opinion research center of the Institute of Sociology at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (CVVM) in March 2016 on the relationship to the ethnic communities living in the Czech Republic is presented in Table 5 below:

Ethnic communities	Very pleasant	Rather pleasant	Neither pleasant nor unpleasant	Rather unpleasant	Very unpleasant	
	1	2	3	4	5	Average
Czechs	50	35	13	1	0	1.66
Slovakians	35	46	17	2	0	1.88
Poles	10	34	38	12	3	2.61
Germans	6	28	39	19	5	2.87
Jews	5	22	42	12	6	2.91
Hungarians	5	21	44	15	5	2.93
Vietnamese	6	26	42	17	8	2.96
Russians	4	18	41	25	9	3.18
Ukrainians	3	17	42	25	11	3.26
Chinese	3	14	39	23	11	3.27
Arabs	1	3	15	31	44	4.20
Gypsies	1	2	14	34	48	4.26

Table 5: Self-described relationships with ethnic communities living in the Czech Republic (CVVM, 2016)[11]

11 See:http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/a7547/f3/ov160420.pdf.

In Table 5, number 1 means "very pleasant"; number 2 "rather pleasant"; number 3 "neither pleasant nor unpleasant"; number 4 "rather unpleasant"; and number 5 "very unpleasant." This Table is presented in percentage of the rolls. The relationship to the Vietnamese community is 2.96 on average, with the highest evaluation "neither pleasant nor unpleasant." However, in fact, this number is already more positive than that in previous years. Please see Table 6:

Ethnic communities	III/2013	III/2014	III/2015	III/2016
Czechs	1.69	1.58	1.59	1.66
Slovakians	1.79	1.72	1.76	1.88
Poles	2.47	2.40	2.47	2.61
Germans	2.87	2.83	2.82	2.87
Jews	2.80	2.67	2.83	2.91
Hungarians	2.96	2.80	2.88	2.93
Vietnamese	3.26	3.09	3.11	2.96
Russians	3.11	3.27	3.31	3.18
Ukrainians	3.57	3.36	3.44	3.26
Chinese	3.35	3.28	3.25	3.27
Arabs	---	3.79	4.02	4.20
Gypsies	4.24	4.21	4.30	4.26

Table 6: Relations with ethnic communities living in the Czech Republic from 2013 to 2016 (CVVM, 2016)[12]

In Table 6, the evaluation of the relationship with the Vietnamese community decreased from 3.26 in 2013 to 2.96 in 2016, a drop of 0.15, revealing a more positive attitude. This phenomenon also corresponds to some new commentaries on the Vietnamese community in the Czech society. For example, in a speech of current Czech President Miloš Zeman delivered in Bratislava, Slovakia on February 12, 2016,[13] he described the Vietnamese people as more "industrious" and having

12 See: the same as in note 11.

13 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6Pw4PHxEKM&nohtml5=False.

"no barrier" of communication, especially compared with the current refugee migrants. He also emphasized that the migration of the current refugees is due to "Islamic migration," and which is "not possible to integrate and is not capable of being assimilated into European culture." He might not represent the entire Czech nation; however, his opinion reflected one popular myth that current refugee flows into Europe are all Islamists. This also explains the importance of understanding the objectives properly to achieve integration; there won't be any successful integration if correct knowledge about the migrants is non-existent. In Table 6, the relationship to the Arabic community appears to have grown more negative over the years, from 3.79 in 2014 to 4.20 in 2016, close to "very unpleasant."

5 Conclusion

As mentioned by Drbohlav (2011, p. 420): "The Czech Republic is drawing nearer to the characteristics and trends observed in Europe's much more developed immigration countries." Nevertheless, a successful integration requires consideration of the interaction of languages and culture among migrants themselves and the host community. If it is only conducted one-sided, integration has a greater chance of failure.

Most of the language policies for migrants are passively oriented, i.e., forced by the circumstance/flows of migrants. However, the authorities must think thoroughly on this issue actively in order to prevent problems caused by any lack of foresight. The current EU language policy for migrants emphasizes more on the acquisition of the languages of host societies. Although the promotion of intercultural dialogue has been also stressed as a political priority, the European society generally is lacking in such recognition. For example, as discussed in this paper, the second generation of the Vietnamese community in Czechia, who are mostly young and well-educated, seem to be assimilating, and their language identity has developed disparately compared with their native families isolated from the host society. This second generation of Vietnamese is exactly the objective sought under the implement of the linguistic

integration policy. This paper concludes that the identity construction of the Vietnamese and their second generation is developing in contrast; most Vietnamese maintain their heritage language and keep living in cultural isolation, but on the other hand the language identity of their well-educated second generation has been changed and needs to be reexamined along with the host country's linguistic integration policy.

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Seven Against Luoyang (or, Sophocles' Antigone is No Chinese Philosopher)

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Abstract

In this paper I argue how, on the one hand, prehistoric *Greek* myth in its account of the catastrophic Labdacid dynasty of Bronze-Age Thebes presented a horror story whose cautionary value Chinese of all schools would have appreciated. Indeed, it even exceeded the worst political and moral scandals in the *Book of History*/*Book of Documents* with its accounts of early Chinese dynasties in steep and fatal decline. On the other hand, the 5th-century BC Athenian playwright Sophocles unknowingly, of course, yet with an uncanny intuition for human possibilities, embodied in characters of his tragedy *Antigone* (ca. 440 BCE) three major ancient Chinese philosophies, namely, in the title character's sister Ismene a "Daoist", in their uncle Creon a "Legalist", and a "Confucian" in Antigone's cousin and fiancé Haemon. As we shall see, the Athenian tragic poet found all three of these persons and their initial positions wanting when contrasted with his own Hellenic-heroic standard of human virtue/excellence. That, of courses is what his protagonist Antigone herself epitomizes. She alone, though dead by her own doing, is fulfilled at the end of the disturbing play.

Keywords: Antigone; Sophocles; Daoism; Legalism; Confucianism; Mencius; Han Fei

Seven Against Luoyang (or, Sophocles' Antigone is No Chinese Philosopher)

The "seven" in my title are the legendary King Laius, his wife Jocasta, and their son Oedipus, plus Oedipus' four children: brothers Eteocles and Polyneices, who slew one another in reciprocal fratricide, and their two younger sisters, Ismene and the famous rebel Antigone. The city Luoyang was principal capital of the Later or Eastern Zhou dynasty, which governed—or failed effectively to govern—a weakened, decentralized empire from 771 BCE through the "Spring and Autumn" period and which suffered slow disintegration during the troubled times of "Warring States" from about 475 BCE onward (or, rather, downward). That long period included the times through which Kong Fuzi/Confucius and Laozi, Mozi, and later Mengzi/Mencius and Zhuangzi lived, taught, and sometimes wrote, contemporaries of grim precursors of Han Feizi. During those turbulent centuries were shaped the three sharply contrasting Chinese philosophies of Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism.[1]

My investigation and speculation here is a trans-Eurasian thought experiment, since I hardly argue for diffusion of such geographically remote Classical Chinese thought into the "barbarian" Aegean world. Classical Chinese philosophy is largely social and moral in reach and grasp, and above all political. That is why I, an outsider, have come to admire it; and that is why a quarter of a century ago it seemed to me and still seems pertinent to consider examples of its thinking in relation to the mixed message of Sophocles' overtly political tragedies, for example his relatively early plays *Ajax* and *Antigone*, each named

1 The origin of this article was a lecture of the same title that I developed for "Civilizations Compared" course at the University of Denver in the 1990s. In the first of its three segments, the antiquarian one that treated ancient China and classical Greece, I from Languages and Literatures participated with colleagues from three other departments (Art History, History, Religious Studies). A descriptive paper was presented at the annual conference of the Rocky Mountain Modern Language Associate in Phoenix, Arizona, in October 1991. Readers will best follow my argument with a version of Sophocles' *Antigone* at hand in any of several adequate translations that indicate line numbers of the original.

after a heroic suicide.

In the former the title character grandly rejects the principles of all three Chinese schools. He defies all gods and all men, particularly goddess Athena and mortals who claim tenuous authority over him, but also his spear-won wife Tecmessa and the masses as represented by the soldier-chorus of the play. He is a radical individualist, with concern only for the little son who survives him, who will bear Ajax's enormous shield (after which the little boy is named Eurysaces, "Broad-Shield") and will be known to his generation as proud Son of Ajax.

In the *Antigone* another suicidal title character positively stands for something radically un-Chinese. Not only does she die for it, but she compels three quasi-philosophic supporting characters to abandon their principles. Moreover, surprisingly for such a heroic figure, she *is* a *she*, and a young female at that.[2]

We look here into probably the later of these two plays with its world-famous protagonist who gives it her name and whose bold stand against her uncle and king Creon has inspired many adaptations and imitations.[3]

To Antigone's sister Ismene we first turn our attention.

Ismene in effect espouses classical Chinese **Daoism**. Several salient features of her deftly drawn character would indeed "prove" her a Daoist were such a thing conceivable. In the first place, of course, Ismene is female but unlike her sister is in several respects feminine, even stereotypically so. The two very young women's relative ages cannot be determined. It may even be that in the earlier tradition Ismene, named on a perplexing 6th-century BC vase, had neither an older sister nor a younger one.[4]

2 Since she is engaged to her cousin Haemon but not yet his wife, Antigone cannot be older than her mid-to-late teens, since in ancient Greek society an unmarried female would normally be married before age twenty, even well before that age.

3 Including what turned out to be a provocative one staged—briefly—in the PRC. See http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-11/30/content_15975618.htm

4 The object, a 6th-century Corinthian amphora in the Louvre (E 640), shows one of the Seven versus Thebes attackers, Tydeus [named], threatening with a sword to slay reclining Ismene [also named]. Google "Tydeus Ismene" and you will see it. (The status of a figure "Antigone" before Sophocles is too long for this note. See the brief Appendix that follows the body of this article).

Let me demonstrate her Daoist tendency. Of indigenous Chinese philosophies the Daoist "Way" may be the most widely known and reasonably well appreciated outside of the Middle Kingdom itself and the Chinese diaspora. I quote two short texts from the *Dao De Jing* to remind us of some of its ethical tenets and of its spirit. First from Poem 38:[5]

> {1} **A man of the highest virtue does not keep to virtue and that is why he has virtue**. A man of the lowest virtue never strays from virtue and that is why he is without virtue. **The former never acts yet leaves nothing undone**. **The latter acts but there are things left undone**. A man of the highest benevolence acts, but from no ulterior motive. A man of the highest rectitude acts, but from ulterior motive. **A man most conversant in the rites acts, but when no one responds rolls up his sleeves and resorts to persuasion by force**. Hence when the way was lost there was virtue; when virtue was lost there was benevolence; when benevolence was lost there was rectitude; when rectitude was lost there were the rites.
>
> **The rites are the wearing thin of loyalty and good faith**
> **And the beginning of disorder;**
> **Foreknowledge is the flowery embellishment of the way**
> **And the beginning of folly.**
>
> (Tranlation by Lau, 1963)

A Daoist, therefore, would praise neither Antigone's nor Creon's course of activism, whether insisting upon personal "rites" (Antigone, of course) or striving for political-scientific "foreknowledge" (Creon). He (or she) rejects such personal aggrandizement as Sophocles' confronted characters each intend, Antigone in defiant glory and sense of belonging (to a family that is honorable only in her esteem), Creon in authority and resolute selfless exercise of power (for the state's good). Ismene rejects both kinds.

5 Not knowing Chinese, Classical or otherwise, I depend upon translations at once authoritative (I hope!) and clear. In all such quotations the most pertinent sentences appear in bold. However, I give these in context and offer brief comments that indicate my understanding.

In second place I quote Poem 33 in its entirety:

{2} He who knows others is clever;
He who knows himself has discernment.
He who overcomes others has force;
He who overcomes himself is strong.
He who knows contentment is rich;
He who perseveres is a man of purpose;
He who does not lose his station will endure;
He who lives out his days has had a long life.
(Tranlation by Lau, 1963)

Suggesting something like the Delphic injunction of the Greeks "Know Thyself", the Philosopher urges us to know our place and to resist impulses based upon dissatisfaction with who we are. Ismene in vain reminds her sister that they are women as well as subjects.

Daoist traits of Ismene thus include apolitical restraint and quietism, indeed all the 'womanly' characteristics as ancient Greeks and Chinese alike supposed these to be.[6] To these we may add her deferential attitude toward others, the high value she places upon living, and a paradoxical lack of concern about the long future and yet a hope that things may turn out all right for the two orphan girls now: without her (or her sister's) action.

I cite finally a famous third passage from the *Dao De Jing* that I believe captures the non-Hellenic essence of the Dao, yet well describes the behavior of Sophocles' Ismene in the prologue and, partly, in her second scene as well, from Poem 67:

{3} I have three treasures
Which I hold and cherish.
The first is known as compassion,
The second is known as frugality,

6 A somewhat tendentious discourse on "Ismene's Choice: Prologue (1-99)" appears as Chapter 2 in Tyrrell and Bennett (1998). The authors may infer too much about what an audience of Athenians are likely to have gotten from the play in performance.

The third is known as not daring to take the lead in the empire;
Being compassionate one could afford to be courageous,
Being frugal one could afford to extend one's territory,
Not daring to take the lead in the empire one could afford to be lord over the vessels [sic: i.e., officials].
Now, to forsake compassion for courage, to forsake frugality for expansion, to forsake the rear for the lead, is sure to end in death.
Through compassion, one will triumph in attack and be impregnable in defence.
What heaven succors it protects with the gift of compassion.

(Tranlation by Lau, 1963)

Defiance and self-assertion are to be avoided, whereas pity or compassion is true to the Way —and is opposed to "courage." Action, if any at all, must not be arbitrary.[7]

This policy fits Ismene perfectly during the opening sequence of the play (especially in her speech at 49-68) and in much of her behavior during its second episode (526-572). Initially she adheres to inaction or rather to gentle, reactive persuasion as a mode of behavior, in efforts to talk Antigone out of recklessly defying Creon, Creon out of hastily executing his niece and affianced daughter-in-law Antigone. That reflects the key Daoist principle of *wei-wu-wei*, "non-action action" or "no arbitrary action", which Ismene urges others to share. On the other hand, even before her second entrance she is frantic about her sister's chosen fate (491-492); and when she reappears she lies about active complicity in the prohibited burial (536-537). She fears for her activist sister, but also for herself if left alone, lonely last of their deceased parents' children.

In fact, 5th-century logician and moral philosopher Mozi and the Mohists might also claim Ismene with her loving, non-violent attitude that is so different from her heroic sister's arrogant *philia*, Antigone's passionate and reckless devotion to their cursed family. However, Ismene's

7 I thank one of the anonymous readers of my manuscript for the observation that *wu-wei-wu* in the *Laozi* has a clear political application and may be rendered "do not act arbitrarily." I thank *both* readers for gentle corrections and improving suggestions.

fundamental indifference to external standards of justice and holiness, even of truth —"indifference" may be slight overstatement, but I do not think it misstates her stance— made her more a follower of Lao's universal Way than of Moh and his distinct -ism.[8] "Made," however, since she abandons that position. She is suddenly audacious enough to wish to join Antigone in condemnation, suicidal though this is. At the same time, her conduct remains profoundly different from that of her angry, self-assertive sister whom "Heaven" hardly succors.

For in Antigone the gods take care of their own business. Although Antigone's will and theirs coincide to a point, i.e., that even the treasonous son of Oedipus who led an unholy attack on his native city must be buried —not honored, but buried— they really do not care what she does. They satisfy their own minimum requirement by covering Polyneices' corpse with dust from at least one dust storm (417-422) and, although this is controverted, appear to have done so by a previous one as well (its preternatural effect described 255-258).[9] On the other hand, the gods do chastise the secular ruler who tried to prevent even token interment, by what in discussing divine and human malevolence I call "sublime punishment."[10] By the end of the play Creon will have caused and must mourn the deaths of a future daughter-in-law whom he thought good enough to betroth to his sole remaining son, of that son, and of his wife Eurydice to boot.

Next in order of appearance in Sophocles' drama as a foil to Antigone is the more central character Creon, to whom we now turn. Oedipus'

8 Our entry-level undergraduate course did not deal separately with Mohism or even mention it, because for simplification my Asianist colleagues deemed that currents of Mohism merged with later Legalism and with the less radical currents of Daoism.

9 Tyrrell and Bennett (1998) deny that gods are responsible for the first covering of Polyneices' corpse with dust "as if by one escaping guilt-of-pollution" (*agos*, 256). They suggest that gods above, who control weather, would not be interested in the rights (and rites) of gods below. However, Sophocles does not distinguish so sharply between them, as we understand in his posthumous *Oedipus at Colonus* (OC 1647-1662). In fact, Creon's sin is not to prohibit loyal citizens from undertaking a token yet sufficient "burial," but to undo gods' intervention—which, even worse, he expressly, angrily denies to be divinely caused (*theēlatos*, 278-288).

10 This phrase describes cruel action whereby an attacker leaves his or her targeted victim physically unharmed, but instead kills, sometimes quite atrociously, one, several, or even all other persons, themselves usually unoffending, who are dearest to the offender. Instances abound in Greek myth, for example in the story of Niobe.

natural-successor *sons* are both dead, as of yesterday. Therefore, the late king's maternal uncle and also (in this tangled family) his brother in-law Creon is promptly acknowledged as regent-king of Thebes. His public words in the office through the first half of the play coincide with doctrine on state policy of the harsh socio-political science-and-engineering movement **Fajia** known in English as **Legalism**. This is probably the least familiar of the Chinese schools in the West—ironically, since a plethora of home-grown political movements in Western lands, based on rigid dogmatism with or without added religious sectarian or racialist dimensions, bear unpleasant resemblance to it. For this dour and pessimistic current of middle Confucianism espoused a totalitarian-statist political philosophy.

Creon's Inaugural Address that opens Episode 1 declares that in the current crisis the state must be everything, family ties nothing (162-210). His angry response to his defiant niece Antigone in Episode 2 explains why, for consistency and firmness in maintaining right order in the state, he must punish her and her distraught sister harshly (473-496). In the 3rd episode his stern lecture to his disloyal son Haemon asserts that, as women must defer to men, sons must do so to fathers, and all to ordinances of the state—all in order that the state may be militarily strong (639-680).

Although early advocates of such thinking date to the early 4th century BCE (Shang Yang et al.) its bitter flavor can be indicated by four short quotations from its principal mature theoretician, the later third-century Qin minister Han Feizi.[11]

> {4} **When the sage rules the state** [Han Fei writes]**, he does not count on people doing good of themselves, but employs such measures as will keep them from doing any evil. If he counts on people doing good of themselves, there will not be enough such people to be numbered by the tens in the whole country. But if he employs such measures as will keep them from doing evil, then the entire state can be brought up to**

11 From DeBary (1960, pp. 124-136).

> **a uniform standard. Inasmuch as the administrator has to consider the many but disregard the few, he does not busy himself with morals but with laws**.

So the effective ruler must forestall evil and disorder by setting down 'Thou Shalt Nots' and make examples of violators by punishing them swiftly harshly and conspicuously.

Later in his handbook of government Han Fei offers a ruler this admonition:

> {5} Those who are ignorant about government insistently say: "Win the hearts of the people." **If order could be procured by winning the hearts of the people, then even the wise ministers Yi Yin and Kuan Chung** [though separated by nine centuries, both were famous for making their states strong, respectively Shang and Qi] **would be of no use. For all that the ruler would need to do would be just to listen to the people. Actually, the intelligence of the people is not to be relied upon any more than the mind of a baby**. If the baby does not have his head shaved, his sores will recur; if he does not have his boil cut open, his illness will go from bad to worse. However, in order to shave his head or open the boil someone has to hold the baby while the affectionate mother is performing the work, and yet he keeps crying and yelling incessantly. **The baby does not understand that suffering a small pain is the way to obtain a great benefit**.

The "baby" here is society, the "boil" a law-breaker. Anglophones have the expression 'Spare the rod and spoil the child', which Han Fei might have amended to 'Spare the axe and unleash the subject'.[12]

Regarding obstructive superstition and religious customs the Legalist declares:

12 It is a curious fact that the ancient Athenians experimented for a time in the 7th century with a broadly death-dealing 'Draconian' criminal code, but soon discarded it.

> {6} **When witches and priests pray for people, they say: "May you live as long as one thousand and ten thousand years!" Even as the sounds, "one thousand and ten thousand years," are dinning upon one's ears, there is no sign that even a single day has been added to the age of any man. That is the reason why people despise witches and priests**. Likewise, when the Confucianists of the present day counsel the rulers they do not discuss the way to bring about order now, but exalt the achievement of good order in the past. They neither study affairs pertaining to law and government nor observe the realities of vice and wickedness, but all exalt the reputed glories of remote antiquity and the achievements of the ancient kings. Sugar coating their speech, the Confucianists say: "If you listen to our words, you will be able to become the leader of all feudal lords." Such people are but witches and priests among the itinerant counselors, and are not to be accepted by rulers with principles. **Therefore, the intelligent ruler upholds solid facts and discards useless frills. He does not speak about deeds of humanity and righteousness, and he does not listen to the words of learned men**.

Whatever Heaven is, its will cannot coincide with the fakery of the "learned" and their specious "humanity", Han Fei maintains, nor approve disorder that is not good for anyone and certainly not good for the entire realm.

Efficient social order is the prime value of Legalism. Heaven is trusted to be on the side of the militant ruler who maintains this, however brutally, as long as he gives due thanks to that Heaven. For the Legalist ruler has no illusion about innate good sense of his subjects nor about the practical effect upon their conduct of the teachings of scholars and holy men. People are understood to be selfish and unruly, venal and easily corruptible. This is the view of Creon (*Ant.* 221-222; cf. 293-303), according to whose suspicions, first, a dutiful military guard (322), later the reverent prophet Tiresias (1035-1039) have been suborned by enemies of the state.

One final passage from Han Fei has particular pertinence —indeed, almost reference— to the Creon of the *Antigone*:

> {7} **If you maintain that good government will always prevail whenever the ruler and the ruled act towards each other like father and son, you imply that there are never any wayward fathers or sons**. According to the nature of man, none could be more affectionate than one's own parents. And yet in spite of the love of both parents not all children are well brought up. Though the ruler be warm in his affection for his people, how is that necessarily any assurance that there would be no disorder? Now the love of the ancient kings for their people could not have surpassed that of the parents for their children. **Since we could not be certain that the children would not be rebellious, how could we assume that the people would definitely be orderly?** Moreover, **if the ruler should shed tears when a penalty was inflicted in accordance with the law, he might thereby parade his humanity, but not thus conduct his government**. Now tearful revulsion against penalties comes from humanity, but necessity of penalties issues from the law. Since even the early kings had to permit the law to prevail and repress their tears, it is clear enough that humanity could not be depended upon for good government.

Sympathy for anyone, loyalty toward a relative, even affection for a wayward son must not deflect the right-thinking ruler from inflicting an advertised penalty.

We may now review the conduct of Creon as ruler. It is often claimed that Creon is a tyrant through and through, that his decree should offend us from the outset. However, not only he is single-mindedly dedicated to what he judges to be good for all members of the state, but his decree is called a *kērugma* (6-8 et alibi), i.e., a publicly "heralded" ordinance, and not merely a *nomos* (59 and later), broadly a "law", but a *psēphos turannōn* (60), "voted on law of de facto rulers"; indeed Creon names the decree *teleia psēphos*, "fully operative law" at 632. That he is called *turannos* does not mean that he is "tyrant" as we use the term but only

that, although he is impromptu *basileus* (155), "king," he cannot claim kingship by male succession in the royal line of Cadmus. Creon is also called *stratēgos* (8) "general" and *arkhōn* (156), "government officer"—both constitutional titles under Athens' democracy. The former belongs to that elective office which Pericles held though most of his seldom contested government of the Athenians, the latter to an office in the 5th century assigned by divinely guided lot.

In his severity toward both his daughter-in-law-never-to-be and his son, and in his disregard for the "disorderly" sentiments of his people (represented by the chorus of aged citizens) who suggest that he mercifully rescind the death sentence that he has imposed upon Antigone, he is not demagogue-tyrant but Legalist through and through. To his unruly niece's *philia*, "family-thinking", thematic in the script, Creon expressly opposes *politeia*, "state-thinking".[13] This is Legalist. Likewise Legalist, as we saw from a quotation above, is his contempt for venerable yet useless customs, for priestly rites and hocus-pocus, and for unpatriotic belief in gods who would do anything *but* support law and order, when gods have proved their support for Thebes by the miraculous defense of the city in the battle of the preceding day under Creon's supreme command. Their city's survival against coordinated onslaught by seven formidable attacking columns still amazes the shaken, now relieved and grateful citizen chorus as they enter the theater. They mention several gods who unmistakably supported, even participated in the city's defense (100-154).

Legalist, finally, is the General's insistence that political authority owns an absolute duty to enforce its laws, whether "good" ones *or* (by thinking of "the wise") "bad," firmly and consistently, even if it thereby offends traditional family pieties, for example, concern for a sister's daughter or even for one's own son. "Unwise" laws that a Han Fei would defend are, in fact, simple, clear, well publicized, and *consistently enforced*

13 Creon's first son Megareus (or Menoeceus) had died in defense of Thebes, by meeting a predicted death in the battle or as a human sacrifice. Creon's role either way is unclear (and in Euripides' late *Phoenician Women* he tries to prevent his son's death!); however, in *Antigone* his wife Eurydice blames him for the death of both their sons (1301-1305). If priest-prophet Tiresias prescribed his first son's death, Creon has reason for ill will toward the prophet!

ones that would reject Confucian scholars' subtleties and "wisdom", and dismiss their confidence in the power of mere good example and moral exhortation. Creon says frankly to his son that he will *not*, by relenting from his death sentence upon a manifest rebel, no matter her relationship, prove himself false to the *polis* (655-658). He goes on to say that "Whoever transgresses or violently opposes laws or is minded to give orders to those in authority will never meet with my approval; but whomever the *polis* has set [in power] he must heed even in matters small, just and the opposite" (…*kai smikra kai dikaia kai tanantia*, 663-667; my translation). What "just things" *are* may, of course, be disputed, as by every unconfessed criminal or fanatic; in fact, the ruler dictates right and duty.

Last but hardly least important, we must consider Creon's son Haemon. Haemon stands, as it were, for the kinder, gentler **Confucianism of Mengzi (Mencius)** that advocated moral example and persuasion, and promoted those very harmony-producing pieties, especially filial devotion together with ritual observance, which Legalists despised. Neither *Ur*confucianism of the *Analects* nor Mencian Confucianism must be confused with the conservative philosophical Neoconfucianism of the Later Empire or with the popular "Confucianist" religion of ancestor-worship. Therefore, I again offer texts, more of them than before for a reason I explain below. We begin with anecdotes of the Great Master Kong himself.[14]

> {8} The Duke of She observed to Confucius: "Among us there was an upright man called Kung who was so upright that when his father appropriated a sheep, he bore witness against him." Confucius said: "The upright men among us are not like that. **A father will screen his son and a son his father —yet uprightness is to be found in that**." [XIII:18]

Law and laws, therefore, are subordinate to personal relationship.

14 Five of these —numbered 8-10, 12-13— come from DeBary (1960, pp. 20-33). The other four —11, 14-16— are from are from D.C. Lau's translations (1979). I choose between them by the criterion of which I find to offer somewhat smoother, clearer articulation of an extract, though on its basic import both translators are agreed.

{9} Confucius said: "**If a ruler himself is upright, all will go well without orders**. But if he himself is not upright, even though he gives orders they will not be obeyed." [XIII:6]

{10} Confucius said: "Lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties, and the people will try to keep out of jail, but will have no sense of shame. **Lead the people by virtue and restrain them by the rules of decorum, and the people will have a sense of shame, and moreover will become good**." [II:3]

These two quotations make clear the requirement that a ruler lead by personal moral example.

{11} The Master said, "When those above are given to the observance of the rites, the common people will be easy to command." [XIV:41]

This adds ritual correctness to the qualifications of an effective ruler.

{12} Confucius said: "There are three things that a gentleman fears: he fears the will of Heaven, he fears great men, he fears the words of the sages. **The inferior man does not know the will of Heaven and does not fear it, he treats great men with contempt, and he scoffs at the words of the sages**." [XVI:8]

This requires that everyone of worth, the "gentleman" (*junzi*), be pious, deferential, and receptive to wise counsel (such as that of the Master himself, of course!) The "inferior man" anticipates, by several generations, Legalist thinking against which the Master hopes to inoculate his disciples as well as rulers smart enough to take his advice. No. 10 above does the like.

{13} Confucius said: "The gentleman is broad minded and not partisan; **the inferior man is partisan and not broad minded**." [II:14]

Another translation of this extremely important statement, Arthur Waley's, goes thus:

{13b} "The Master said, A gentleman can see a question from all sides without bias. **The small man is biased and can see a question only from one side**."

The straightforward, simplistic, unnuanced judgment of a Legalist is unworthy of a good and thoughtful person, who gathers facts and ponders alternatives, even changes of course.

In keeping with this Creon's son Haemon adopts that critical attitude toward the General as a ruler and as a highly placed man which Nos. 11-13 above would prescribe. This is in part because of his father's haughty and obstinate character, but also because he does not measure up to the positive qualifications indicated in preceding Nos. 8-10.

Three further statements from the Analects are especially apt for understanding Haemon as Creon's *son* at the beginning of his scene with his father, in the central episode of Sophocles' play. Initially the young man begins duly deferential to his father (635-638, even 683-687), yet makes clear —I think we must believe him— that Creon's authority in the state may be impaired by widespread popular disapproval. The Thebans, the young man says, may disagree with his father's decree after hearing Antigone's public defense of her action, and certainly with his condemnation of the princess, who, Haemon says, is in fact widely admired (688-700). He explicitly urges judicious flexibility instead of stubborn rigor (710-718). However, by the end of the episode (751-765) and later in his reported behavior at the underground chamber after he finds Antigone already dead (1212-1239), he has become a rebel himself, a violent unfilial one.

Here is some Confucian thought on filial duties:

> {14} Yu Tzu [an eminent disciple of the Great Master] said, "**It is rare for a man whose character is such that he is good as**

> **a son and obedient as a young man to have inclinations to transgress against his superiors**; it is unheard of for one who has no such inclination to be inclined to start a rebellion. The gentleman devotes his efforts to the roots, for once the roots are established, the Way will grow therefrom. **Being good as a son and obedient as a young man is, perhaps, the root of a man's character**." [I:2]
>
> {15} The Master himself said, "**A young man should be a good son at home and an obedient young man abroad**, sparing of speech but trustworthy in what he says, and should **love the multitude at large but cultivate the friendship of his fellow men**." [I:6]
>
> {16} The Master said, "**In serving your father and mother you ought to dissuade them from doing wrong in the gentlest way. If you see your advice being ignored, you should not become disobedient but remain reverent. You should not complain even if in doing so you wear yourself out**." [IV:18]

The first and third of the above statements speak for themselves. Here we have the prescribed behavior of a son, whose first duty is to his father, yet in cases where a father is doing wrong he must correct him respectfully, or keep trying if he resists. No. 15 declares that a son may love "the multitude", but not that he must heed or should be guided by it. Confucianism is hierarchic, not democratic. A noble youth's solidarity is with the gentlemen-elite, with those like himself and like his father in status.

In our play both father and son have failed. Creon never followed the Way, Daoist or Confucian, and promptly lost whatever Mandate of Heaven Thebes' crisis thrust upon him. In contrast, Haemon at first walks it, including in his attention to "the multitude"; but then he willfully departs from it, allowing the Theban people to influence him and, in the heat of sexual passion (*erōs*, of whose dangerous power the chorus sing in the immediately following third stasimon at 781-800). In

public he defies and even vilifies his father as starkly as Antigone did. He loses his way by the end of the father-son-episode

Within a century and a half after the death of Confucius in 479 BCE several distinct schools had arisen, all purporting to follow the Great Master's teachings. (Likeness to the several and diverse Greek schools that claimed Socrates as their founder is striking, not to mention multifarious Christian sects.)

The following two anecdotes from the book *Mencius* shows Mengzi, an optimist in his assessment of innate human goodness, confronted with the Confucian Kao, whose thinking about people's basic resistance (like willow wood) or at best, indifference (like water) to good order and morality anticipates that of the Legalists —and resembles Creon's:[15]

> {17} Kao Tzu said, "Human nature is like the ch'i willow. Dutifulness is like cups and bowls. To make morality out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow."
>
> "Can you," said Mencius, "make cups and bowls by following the nature of the willow? Or must you mutilate the willow to make it into cups and bowls? **If you have to mutilate the willow to make it into cups and bowls, must you, then, also mutilate a man to make him moral?**" [Mencius VI.A.1]

Mengzi here asks what he hopes is a rhetorical question with a negative answer. But that is not Kao's or Creon's. Both believe in the need for rough, exemplary coercion.

> {18} Kao Tzu said, "Human nature is like whirling water. Give it an outlet to the east and it will flow east; give it an outlet in the west and it will flow west. Human nature does not show any preference for either good or bad just as water does not show any preference for either east or west."

15 Mengzi is quoted from D. C. Lau (1970).

> "It certainly is the case," said Mencius, "that water does not show any preference for either east or west, but does it show the same indifference to high and low? **Human nature is good just as water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is no water that does not flow downward**.
>
> "Now in the case of water, by splashing it one can make it shoot up higher than one's forehead, and by forcing it one can make it stay on a hill. **How can that be the nature of water?** It is the circumstances being what they are. **That man can be made bad shows that his nature is no different from that of water in this respect**." [Mencius VI.A.2]

"Circumstances" indeed precipitate Haemon's moral collapse. His father is to blame, of course; yet it is Antigone's one-woman rebellion that set in motion a chain reaction of tragic activity.

Two further pieces from the *Mencius* will show this thinker's positive and hopeful view of human possibility and government's responsibility:

> {19} Mencius said, "No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the sufferings of others...
>
> "My reason for saying [this:] Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human. The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; the heart of shame, of dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom.

> Man has these four germs just as he has four limbs. **For a man possessing these four germs to deny his own potentialities is for him to cripple himself; for him to deny the potentialities of his prince is for him to cripple his prince. If a man is able to develop all these four germs that he possesses, it will be like a fire starting up or a spring coming through. When these are fully developed, he can take under his protection the whole realm within the Four Seas, but if he fails to develop them, he will not be able even to serve his parents**." [Mencius II.A.6]

And finally:

> {21} Mencius said, "**The people are of supreme importance; the altars to the gods of earth and grain come next; last comes the ruler... When a ...lord endangers the altars to the gods of earth and grain he should be replaced**. When the sacrificial animals are sleek, the offerings are clean and the sacrifices are observed at due times, and yet floods and droughts come, then the altars should be replaced." [Mencius VII.B.14]

This rules out Creon's first stance and sanctions Haemon's initial position. However, in his rash lunge to kill the head of state (and his own father), Haemon ultimately shows that his interest in "the people" and in right social order is of no more consequence than his financée's claim about what divine laws require. For later, in Antigone's final scene, on her way to living interment she is forced to confess that her reasons for defiant burial of her brother were personal, not moral.[16] We learn in retrospect that the princess had adduced "the gods" for a pretext, every bit as speciously as those priests whom Han Fei vilified ever did. Through to the end Antigone, too, ignores the interest of the state and dismisses the sympathy of the chorus.

We spend so much space on Confucius and Mencius because their original position, in two senses, ought not to be misunderstood. Ideologically, both of them were critics of the petty kings and would-be emperors

16 More on this below.

of their times, not, like the Neoconfucianist Mandarins, boosters—and flatterers—of Sui, Tang, and especially Song rulers and beyond, through successive dynasties all the way till 1911. Nor in religion were they mere ritualistic (and superstitious) ancestor-worshipers, but rather were concerned to establish a hierarchical orderliness that embraced all persons, including the reverend dead, and to maintain careful ritual performance, *li*, a cardinal virtue, with respect to the living and the dead alike. Everything, for them as for Haemon in the first part of his scene with his father, must be based upon the two premises that people are fundamentally good, and can be induced to show this to be so by a benevolent ruler *who will learn from good advisers and sometimes from his own mistakes*. However, regardless of what "Heaven" may want (note that Haemon makes no appeal to the gods), regardless, too of the fact that piety like Antigone's is natural and beneficial to *human* society (which it is, in Confucian thinking, but not as an absolute) Haemon allies himself passionately, recklessly with the rebel against his father and a state in crisis.

There, then, are three dramatic characters and their philosophies-in-action. Tested by confrontation with Antigone's most un-Chinese self-assertion each of them falters and fails, abandoning her or his initial position. Their respective "philosophies" fail to sustain them.

Between the two scenes in which **Ismene** appears, after meditating on what Antigone has proposed and has done, she herself becomes activist, too, and even suicidal (536-566). Her "reason" is admiration for Antigone and unwillingness to be separated from her, even if it means her own untimely death. In fact, she tries to join in Antigone's punishment, showing an unexpected eagerness for retrospective action —action, and action falsely claimed at that. Her refusal to "herald" her sister's rebellious act, as Antigone herself urged her to do (86-87), is hardly complicity.

Before the end of the single scene in which he appears **Haemon** becomes violent, and anything but filial, toward his father; subsequently, in the presence of Antigone's corpse in a shocking off-stage scene that a

messenger narrates, he lunges at Creon with a sword, suddenly a would-be patricide. So much for Confucian pieties!

Creon himself, terrified by Tiresias and concerned for his family after all, surrenders when he attempts to pardon Antigone even though she openly, knowingly violated his one and only decree. He gives in to his niece and subject. Tragically for him he arrives at her living tomb too late to save her. He gives in also to Haemon, even humbly abases himself in *suppliant* pleading (1230) before a son who has gone over to his antagonist's side, whom likewise he cannot save. Finally he yields to the non-rational, non-patriotic gods, whose comfort his niece never enjoyed but whose wrath he himself certainly feels, as noted above.

The new king learns pretty much the lesson a Confucius or a Mencius might wish him to learn —too late. Victorious in the end are those fickle Greek gods, but also in a grandly tragic way the glorified anti-social heroine who asserted her*self* in a most discordant way, who displayed loyalty to her agnate family (virtuous in Confucian thinking) but no shame or deference before a man, an elder, and a ruler; no pity for her frightened sister; nor any feeling at all for the young man who loved her.

Oedipus' resolute daughter-and-sister demonstrates no self-preserving wisdom, nor even a selfless devotion to the rituals, as her shocking words about why she had to bury her *brother* betray. She admits that she would have had no such compulsion to perform funeral rites for a dead *husband* or *child*, making this so clear that incrdulous scholars have gravely proposed cutting the offending verses from the script (905-915). Indeed, she may be compared to Ajax who, by his suicide-sacrifice, compels the gods to heed him as he curses hated persons, effecting death to countless Greeks drowned on their way home, to others, like Agamemnon, when they arrived there, and much suffering to Menelaus and Odysseus. Likewise Antigone, by a valedictory prayer (925-928) and invocation (938-943) and then by her willful suicide, dooms Creon to a pathetic widowed, sonless life. Her "sublime punishment" of the offender is at most partially conscious, since she can hardly anticipate the second and thirds suicides that follow hers. However, like her wish

that her brother be buried, this catastrophe coincides with the intentions of the gods. As in every play by this poet *they* know well what *they* are doing. In any case, no Chinese scholar of any school would eagerly kill himself in order to rejoin dead kin, let alone to punish an impious enemy. *Tian*, "Heaven", on the other hand, when time comes to reinvest its Ming, "Mandate", might well so treat a Creon as it does evil emperors who bring an end to their dynasties.

Appendix: "Antigone" and "Creon's Decree" before Sophocles' hypothesized extraordinary invention in Antigone

There is no textual evidence for a girl child "Antigone" as fruit of Oedipus's incestuous marriage before Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* staged in 467 BCE. That is, it "*premièred*" in that year as we might say. However, convergent testimonia indicate that a son of the playwright (Euphorion is named) was specially licensed to revive his father's plays in the 420s.

Because of close attention, even allusion that Euripides and Sophocles suddenly paid to material from Aeschylean trilogies, for example, to the central play of the *Oresteia*, we infer that the Theban trilogy can also have been re-staged, i.e. *Laius*, *Oedipus*, and *Eteocles*-alias-*Seven Against Thebes*. On that occasion the script of the concluding play may have been adjusted to acknowledge an "Antigone" whom Sophocles [1] had irrevocably added to this catastrophic royal family in the 440s, [2] included as one of Oedipus' two silent, maiden daughters *un*named at 1462-1514 in his *Oedipus Tyrannus* of (probably) the early 420s, and [3] brought back as an important speaking character, with sister Ismene, for the posthumous *Oedipus at Colonus.*

Euripides answered the challenge of Sophocles' *Antigone* by composing one of his own, lost, but probably late. We think we know something about it. Antigone *lived* and, after secret obsequies for Polyneices, eloped with Haemon. The couple both die later, however, discovered and confronted by a dastardly "Creon," this one resembles the haughty and

belligerent "Creon" who remains offstage in the Euripidean *Suppliants* and the melodramatic villain "Creon" whom Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* brings on stage, but not at all the unpatriotic weakling "Creon" in Euripides' *Phoenician Women*.

Biles (2005-2006) casts doubt on any special license for and even on the postulated Aeschylean revivals in the 420s. Whether or not the late playwright's Theban plays were restaged then, we know of 4th century performances of works by all Athens' Big Three tragedians. Any of the "Antigones" mentioned above that followed Sophocles' *Antigone* or even a recorded 4th-century *Antigone* by a poet named Astydamas the Younger could have suggested alterations at the end of *Seven* before the texts were supposedly fixed in the 340s or '30s. Indeed, its alternate name *Seven against Thebes*, familiar in the late 5th century (Aristophanes' *Frogs,* 1021), may come from a revival. Comic Aristophanes knew Aeschylus' play that has come down to us as *Choephoroe* under the title *Oresteia* (equivalent to "*Orestes*" since his verse wanted the extra syllable: *Frogs*, 1124.) This may hint at revival of that play first performed half a century before.

Another question arises. How old is the "Athenian tradition" (as venerable Sophoclean scholar R. C. Jebb calls it) that the crisis government of Thebes prevented funerals for its fallen attackers? Boeotian Pindar contradicts it (*Nem*. 9.21-27 and *Ol*. 6.12-17), and would likely have refuted it explicitly had he known it. Does it too come from this momentous play?

Probably not. In Aeschylus' lost *Eleusinians* Athenians persuaded Thebans to allow proper funeral rites for (all?) the slain attackers. On the other hand, there was an old tradition, followed eventually by Roman Statius, that Oedipus' fratricidal sons were both burned on a single conflicted pyre (*Theb.* 12.429-436). Polyneices' corpse was secretly added to the smoldering pyre of his brother by their sister Antigone and Polyneices' widow Argia.

Euripides' *Suppliants* addresses the post-battle crisis from the side of

all the attackers' families who want their dead relatives' bodies back duly to bury (and who will recover them only thanks to Athenian armed intervention). An evil Creon reigns at Thebes, who sends an equally evil herald to Athens declaring his prohibition. This jingoistic play is certainly later than the Sophoclean *Antigone*, from a time when Athens and Thebes were openly at war. (The year 423 BCE has been conjectured.)

The Thebans were enemies of Athens throughout the fifth century. For Athenian writers to make their ancestors guilty of such atrocity as Iliadic heroes at their most brutal intended (exulting Hector to slain Patroclus's corpse) or perpetrated (wrathful Achilles to Hector's) would be pleasing nationalist propaganda. Furthermore, it would be tactful on the part of Sophocles who, though elected admiral once by the Athenians, was no admirer of democracy and demagogues, to displace critique of his countrymen's own irreligious policy that prohibited burial on Attic soil to traitorous citizens who attacked the democratic state. See the thoughtful discussion in Anderson (2015) with background information and analysis in Rosivach (1983).

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Book Review:

Los estudios sobre marcadores del discurso en español, hoy

Reseña de Oscar Loureda Lamas y Esperanza Acín Villa (Coord.) (2010). *Los estudios sobre marcadores del discurso en español, hoy.* Madrid: Arco-Libros. ISBN: 978-84-7635-795-8.

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El estudio de las *partículas discursivas*, desde la publicación de los estudios pioneros en español —Fuentes (1987) *Enlaces extraoracionales* y Mederos (1988) *Procedimientos de cohesión en español actual*—, se ha convertido, sin lugar a dudas, en uno de los temas más estudiados en la Lingüística española actual, provocando una inflación bibliográfica.

Ante este panorama, las setecientas cuarenta y seis páginas que componen *Los estudios sobre marcadores del discurso en español, hoy* suponen una obra necesaria: se trata de un excelente compendio de doce trabajos —redactados por especialistas consagrados en el tema— en los que, de un lado, se hace balance de lo que se ha hecho y se somete a discusión los progresos de cada uno de los ámbitos acotados; y de otro, se apuntan las tendencias que podrían dominar el debate en los próximos años. En este sentido, como indican los coordinadores de esta obra, el libro puede leerse 'horizontalmente', para formarse una imagen multidimensional completa de la investigación sobre los marcadores del discurso, o 'verticalmente', para tener acceso en profundidad a cada uno de los ámbitos investigadores delimitados" (p. 31).

La obra consta de un preámbulo —redactado conjuntamente por los coordinadores del volumen a modo de presentación— seguido de doce capítulos. Los primeros seis capítulos conforman un bloque en que se examinan los aspectos más debatidos de los *marcadores del*

discurso (MD): su delimitación conceptual, cuestiones de prosódicas, de morfología, de sintaxis, de semántica, de estructura informativa y su colocación dentro de los enunciados y/o segmentos textuales:

— En el capítulo 1, "Los marcadores del discurso y su significante: en torno al interfaz marcadores-prosodia en español" (pp. 61-92), A. Navarro Hidalgo establece dos estadios en esta línea de investigación: una primera fase, que abarca estudios "intuitivos" de la relación MD-prosodia, cuyas aseveraciones se basan en apreciaciones de los investigadores y, una segunda, en la que se emplean herramientas de análisis acústico. Finalmente, apunta a una serie de elementos que, en su opinión, deberían incluir investigaciones futuras: el análisis del entorno prosódico anterior y posterior al MD, la reducción fónica del MD, la constitución o no de contorno melódico propio por parte del MD, y, en el caso de que sí constituya contorno melódico propio, el tipo de perfil del MD.

— En el capítulo 2, "Los marcadores del discurso y su morfología" (pp. 93-182), M.ª A. Martín Zorraquino se plantea las dos cuestiones principales que debe tener en cuenta una caracterización morfológica de estas unidades: su estatuto como clase de palabras y el análisis de su estructura interna. Respecto a lo primero, llega a la conclusión de que el paradigma de los MD no es un elenco cerrado, sino una nómina que se construye en la propia actividad discursiva, de modo que podemos encontrar elementos que se ajustan a dicho estatuto de una forma más central o más periférica. En cuanto a su estructura interna, se esfuerza por determinar los rasgos más generales que la caracterizan, como son la no productividad derivativa de los signos que desempeñan esta función, su formación léxica…

— En el capítulo 3, "Los marcadores del discurso y su sintaxis" (pp. 183-240), C. Llama Saíz, además de llevar a cabo una revisión bibliográfica, aboga por una nueva visión del análisis sintáctico de los MD, que da por hecho una orientación discursiva de la sintaxis y que defiende su necesaria complementariedad con la semántica y la pragmática para explicar las propiedades sintácticas de los MD.

— En el capítulo 4, "Los marcadores del discurso y su semántica" (pp. 241-280), S. Murrillo Ornat cuestiona, de una manera muy ilustrativa, el clásico planteamiento de la Teoría de la Relevancia, que adscribe un significado meramente procedimental a los MD, al que contrapone, a modo de solución, un enfoque instruccional ecléctico que aúne instrucciones argumentativas, formulativas y de organización discursiva.

— En el capítulo 5, "Los marcadores del discurso y la estructura informativa", (pp. 281-326), J. Portolés examina las instrucciones que introducen los MD en relación a la estructura informativa de los enunciados en los que aparecen, concluyendo que para explicar sus instrucciones es preciso esclarecer cuatro fenómenos: tópico/comentario, foco/alternativa, tema/rema y escalaridad.

— En el capítulo 6, "Unidades, marcadores del discurso y posición" (pp. 327-358), A. Briz y S. Pons Bordería demuestran que la posición de los MD debe entenderse en interrelación con aquellas unidades discursivas (subacto, acto, intervención, intercambio, diálogo) en las que los MD se insertan.

A continuación, el lector se encuentra un segundo bloque, conformado por los cuatro siguientes capítulos, en que se repasan algunos de los aspectos variacionistas de los MD: variación en función del tipo de texto, variación en función de si se trata de lengua hablada-escrita; las variaciones diatópicas y diastráticas de los MD y la variación diacrónica de los MD:

— En el capítulo 7 "Los marcadores del discurso y los tipos textuales" (pp. 359-414), M.ª N. Domínguez García, partiendo de la tipología textual de Adam (1992) —textos narrativos, descriptivos, expositivos, argumentativos y conversacionales)— señala la tendencia de uso de ciertos MD o la prominencia de alguna de sus funciones en una determinada secuencia textual. No obstante, este planteamiento es muy amplio, pues la taxonomía de Adam emplea tipos "artificiales": un texto narrativo, por ejemplo, se actualiza en

diversos géneros (noticia, reportaje, crónica, cuento…) y, pese a ser todos ellos narrativos, no emplearán los mismos MD ni presentarán los mismos valores.

— En el capítulo 8 "Los marcadores del discurso y la variación lengua hablada vs. lengua escrita" (pp. 415-496), A. López Serena y M. Borreguero Zuloaga examinan las diferencias en el uso y en las funciones de los MD en función de lo hablado y de lo escrito concluyendo que, para avanzar en su estudio, es necesario estudiar su distribución desde un enfoque funcional que incorpore las tres macrofunciones (interaccional, cognitiva y metadiscursiva).

— En el capítulo 9 "Marcadores del discurso, variación dialectal y variación social" (pp. 497-522), P. Carbonero Cano y J. Santana Marreno exponen la gran diversidad de enfoques y objetivos en los trabajos dedicados a estos dos tipos de variación en los MD. Ahora bien, este repaso nos permite constatar que los análisis se centran exclusivamente en muestras orales o casi orales —encuestas o tareas de completar el discurso (Discourse-Completation Task)— asumiendo tácitamente que en el discurso escrito las diferencias, respecto a los MD, no existen o son marginales, cuando investigaciones, por ejemplo, desde la *Retórica Intercultural* están mostrando divergencias en la frecuencia y valores de un MD en un texto dado en una u otra variante lingüística.

— En el capítulo 10 "Los marcadores del discurso en la historia del español" (pp. 523-616), L. Pons Rodríguez nos muestra las diversas líneas de investigación en los estudios diacrónicos de los MD, desde una triple perspectiva: la primera, historiográfica —estableciendo una periodización—, la segunda, los diversos modelos empleados, y la tercera, qué MD han sido estudiados diacrónicamente y cuáles quedan pendientes.

Finalmente, la obra se cierra con un bloque que comprende los dos últimos capítulos: en el primero, se aborda el tratamiento léxico de estas unidades, y en el que cierra esta obra, los MD y la Lingüística Aplicada,

en concreto, sus réditos en relación con su enseñanza y su traducción:

— En el capítulo 11, "Los marcadores del discurso y su tratamiento lexicográfico" (pp. 617-688), R. González Ruiz, de un lado, tras un clarividente análisis, subraya la dificultad de definir los MD (definición que debe ser imperativamente funcional) así como la problemática macro y microestructural en el diseño lexicográfico de los MD; y de otro lado, analiza los pros y los contras de las recientes obras y proyectos lexicográficos centrados en MD.

— En el capítulo 12, "Los marcadores del discurso y la lingüística aplicada" (pp. 689-746), C. Fuentes Rodríguez, por un lado, realiza una revisión crítica de los tipos de aplicaciones que se han llevado a cabo en el ámbito de los MD. Este repaso le lleva a constatar, por ejemplo, su precaria presencia, en líneas generales, en los manuales de ELE (aparecen los conectores prototípicos y se indican solamente los valores básicos, no las diferencias), así como los pocos trabajos existentes en relación con la enseñanza de composición de textos (si bien desde la publicación de este volumen estos últimos han aumentado)… Por otro lado, esta autora formula una amplia y sugestiva propuesta (pp. 710-734) hacia nuevas vías y metodologías de aplicación.

En definitiva, el valor de esta obra estriba en aunar bajo un mismo volumen diferentes caracterizaciones de los MD a partir de investigaciones de diferentes especialidades y, al mismo tiempo, señalar puntos de reflexión que servirán de acicate para futuras investigaciones.